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Abstract
Cloud-based imaging, which is being increasingly used to store and process volume data/images,
presents security and privacy challenges. Although these challenges have been addressed for cloud-
based storage, to the best of our knowledge, they are still a concern for cloud-based volume data/image
processing, such as image scaling/cropping and volume ray-casting. In this thesis, we address
this concern for cloud-based image scaling/cropping and cloud-based volume ray-casting by using
Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing and its variant (l, k, n) ramp secret sharing, which are homomorphic
to addition and scalar multiplication operations, to hide volume data/images in datacenters.
Firstly, we address the incompatibility issue of the floating point operations of a volume data/image
processing algorithm with the modular prime operation of Shamir’s secret sharing either by con-
verting the floating point operations to fixed point operations or by excluding the modular prime
operation from secret sharing. Our analysis shows that the former technique can degrade the image
quality and the latter can degrade security.
Then, we integrate secret sharing with image scaling/cropping, pre-classification volume ray-
casting, and post-classification volume ray-casting, and propose three cloud-based frameworks. The
frameworks have been designed with the philosophy that a server secret shares volume data/image
and distributes the shares (i.e., hidden data/images) among n datacenters; a datacenter, upon request
from a user, processes the hidden volume data/image, and sends the processed volume data/image
(which is also hidden) to the user; and the user recovers the secret processed volume data/image
from k hidden processed volume data/images. Experiments and analyses show that our frameworks
can provide data confidentiality, data integrity, and data availability; and can incur low computation
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Digital imaging is being increasingly used in a variety areas of daily life such as medicine [1, 2],
personal photography, teaching and learning [3], etc. In this technique, a pipeline of five main steps
(shown in Figure 1.1): data capturing, data preprocessing (which removes unnecessary details,
such as noise, from captured data), data-to-image conversion, image processing (such as scaling
and cropping), and image display, are followed to produce an image from an object, and display the
image to a user.
With advances in telecommunication, remote digital imaging techniques, such as teleradiology
or telepathology, have become popular. In these techniques, the intermediatory imaging steps, such
as data preprocessing, data-to-image conversion, and image processing, are performed by the server.




Image Display Image 
Processing 
Figure 1.1: Digital imaging pipeline.








Figure 1.2: Server-side rendering.
For example, in the case of 2D image visualization, a server typically converts data to an image, as
the required operations are implicit in a data capturing device. Similarly, in the case of 3D image
visualization, server-side data rendering (shown in Figure 1.2), which both captures and renders
data at the server end, is often used [4, 5, 6]. Furthermore, in an image streaming framework, image
processing is also performed at the server end.
With the increase in the size of an image and the requirement of managing multiple users, it is no
longer feasible for an organization, such as a hospital, to store and process large data/images. For
example, storing and processing huge whole slide images, each having a size in the scale of tens of
GBs in uncompressed form [7], presents a scalability issue. Therefore, organizations are relying on
third party cloud datacenters for the storage, processing, sharing, and management of data/images.
In addition to being more scalable, such cloud-based imaging solutions are more economical, offer
better computing resources, and can produce lower visualization latency by storing/processing the
data/image in a datacenter closer to the user.
Three important data/image processing schemes are image scaling/cropping for 2D image visu-
alization, and pre-classification volume ray-casting and post-classification volume ray-casting for
3D image visualization. Downloading a large image, such as a whole slide image to users may not
be always feasible. Users may want to preview a scaled down version of the image before deciding
whether to download the image. Further, users may just want view a particular region of interest in
the image, in which case, a cropped region should be downloaded. These two operations, scaling
and cropping, can be combined to support zooming and panning, two natural user interactions to
The voxel grid figure has been obtained from http://johnrichie.com/V2/richie/isosurface/volume.html






















(b) 3D image visualization
Figure 1.3: Cloud-based image visualization
explore large images. On the other hand, the volume rendering schemes produce an image from
the physical properties of an object. Among the volume rendering schemes, volume ray-casting
algorithms are popular since they render better quality image than other rendering schemes [8].
Figure 1.3 shows the cloud-based image scaling/cropping and cloud-based volume ray-casting
scenarios. As shown in the figure, in the case of 2D image visualization, a datacenter scales/crops
an image [9]), and in the case of 3D image visualization, a datacenter renders a 3D image from a
3D volumetric data [10, 11, 12].
Although third-party cloud-based volume data/image storage and processing has many advan-
tages, the security of the volume data/image and the privacy of the owner of the volume data/image
are two main concerns [13, 14]. For example, in the case of medical imaging, an adversary can
access a datacenter that stores medical volume data/images of patients and misuse the information
in several ways. Firstly, for economical benefits, the adversary may illegally sell the disease infor-
mation of patients to other interested parties such as insurance companies (confidentiality issue).
Secondly, a medical image can be tampered to provide misleading information to doctors (integrity
issue). Thirdly, for publicity, both the health information and the name of the admitting hospital of a
prominent person can be disclosed to unauthorized individuals (privacy issue). Due to these poten-
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Scanned  Image in Server Image in Datacenter Image Received by 
User 
Hidden Image in Server 
Processed Image in 
Datacenter 
Image Recovered by 
User 
(a) Secure cloud-based 2D image visualization
Scanned  3D data in Server Data in Datacenter Image Received by User 
Hidden Data in Server Rendered Image in 
Datacenter 
Image Recovered by 
User 
(b) Secure cloud-based 3D image visualization
Figure 1.4: Our objective for 2D/3D image visualization
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tial threats, laws, such as the HIPPA act in USA, the PIPED act in Canada, and the Data Protection
Act in European countries, have been enacted to protect the data/images of citizens.
A common approach to addressing the security and privacy issues is the use of cryptographic
techniques to hide important information of volume data/images from the datacenters. Although
this solution is available for cloud-based volume data/image archives [15, 16], such a solution does
not exist for cloud-based image scaling/cropping or cloud-based volume ray-casting.
1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis focuses on performing image scaling/cropping and volume ray-casting operations in
hidden domain.
We assume that (i) the server, which owns the secret data/image, and outsources storage/processing
to n datacenters is secured (no adversary can access the server); (ii) a datacenter is honest (honestly
performs requested operations), but can be curious (can try to know content of data/image); (iii) no
more than k − 1 (where, k ≤ n) datacenters can communicate with each other; and (iv) the client
is secured. Furthermore, we also assume that an adversary cannot access the communication links,
storage devices, or processing devices of k or more datacenters at any point of time.
Our objective is to hide the volume data/image S from a datacenter using a cryptosystem H(·),
and allow operationR(·) on the hidden volume data/imageH(S) such that: (i) the datacenter cannot
know application-specific confidential information of the secret volume data/image S or the secret
processed volume data/image R(S) from the hidden volume data/image H(S) or the hidden pro-
cessed volume data/image R(H(S)), (ii) a client can recover R(S) from at least k R(H(S))’s, (iii)
a client can detect tampering onH(S) orR(H(S)) when n ≥ k, and (iv) a client will able to recover
a R(S) even if n− k datacenters cannot participate. We mainly focus on three commonly used vol-
ume data/image processing schemes: image scaling/cropping, pre-classification volume ray-casting
algorithm, and post-classification volume ray-casting. We illustrate the objective in Figure 1.4,
which shows that: (i) the server hides volume data/image before sending it to the datacenters, (ii)
a datacenter renders hidden volume data to produce noise-like rendered image, or scales/crops a
hidden image to produce a noise-like scaled/cropped image, and (iii) the user recovers the secret
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image from the noise-like rendered or scaled/cropped images.
Note that our approach can introduce overhead as it performs extra operations by requiring a
server to hide the volume data/image, and a client to recover the hidden image. One of our objectives
is to lessen this overhead. Furthermore, we also want to provide information theoretical security to
protect the volume data/image from an adversary having unlimited computational capability. In
summary, we aim to find solutions keeping the following points in mind.
(i) Confidentiality: Neither the original volume data/image nor the processed volume data/image
should disclose any information to a datacenter.
(ii) Integrity: Tampering with volume data or images in a datacenter should be detected by the
user.
(iii) Availability: A user should be able to obtain the requested volume data/images even if some
datacenters are unable to function.
(iv) Privacy: The privacy of a person associated with the volume data/image (for example, a
patient in the case of medical imaging) should be preserved.
(v) Computational efficiency: The computational overhead in processing volume data/images
should be minimized. The computation cost in recovering secret volume data/images should
be suitable for visualization latency, and the computations should be supported by the user’s
computing device.
(vi) Bandwidth efficiency: The data overhead in transmitting hidden volume data/images from a
datacenter to a user should be minimal and suitable to the Web.
(vii) High quality image: Any degradation in image quality should be minimal.
Fulfilling all the above requirements may be difficult as it is very likely for there to be a tradeoff
between them. For example, it may be difficult to provide both high security and low overhead
together. One of our goals is to study the tradeoffs carefully and propose application-specific solu-
tions.
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1.3 Technical Challenges
Volume data/images can be hidden from a datacenter by applying a cryptosystem, such as a data en-
cryption technique [16] or secret sharing [17], at the server end. The applied cryptosystem, however,
should be homomorphic to the mathematical operations performed on the volume data/images to en-
sure that the required secret image can be recovered from the processed hidden volume data/images.
In other words, if the cryptosystem hides a secret volume data/image S with an operation H(·), a
datacenter performs the R(·) operation on the hidden volume data/image H(S), and a user recov-
ers the processed secret image from the processed hidden volume data/image R(H(S)) with an
operation H−1(·), then the condition
R(S) ≈ H−1(R(H(S)))
must hold.
Finding a cryptosystem that is homomorphic to the operations performed by a datacenter is a
concern. Available fully homomorphic cryptosystems have impractical overheads [18, 19], and
available somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems are only homomorphic to certain imaging opera-
tions [20].
Furthermore, any selected cryptosystem operates on a finite field GF(q) [21], and is therefore
incompatible with the floating point operations of a volume data/image processing algorithm. For
example, even if Shamir’s secret sharing is homomorphic to addition and scalar multiplication [22],
we cannot use it to secure the polynomial interpolation used in most imaging techniques, since it
requires modular prime operations. This incompatibility issue is another concern.
1.4 Summary of Contribution
Our work first addresses the technical challenges discussed above, and then applies the solutions
to design a cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework and two cloud-based volume render-
ing frameworks. These frameworks can hide application-specific confidential information from
a datacenter, detect tampering on volume data/image, and operate even when certain number of
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datacenters do not participate. For simplicity, we call our image scaling/cropping framework as
secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework, the volume rendering framework using
pre-classification volume ray-casting as secure cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-casting
framework, and the volume rendering framework using post-classification volume ray-casting as
secure cloud-based post-classification volume ray-casting framework in the rest of this thesis.
1.4.1 Choosing a cryptosystem
Since one of our objectives is to lessen the overheads of our frameworks, we choose to use a some-
what homomorphic cryptosystem over a fully homomorphic cryptosystem. There are two main
types of somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems: (i) secret sharing-based schemes, and (ii) public
key encryption-based schemes. The encryption-based schemes assume that an adversary does not
posses enough computational power to decrypt a publicly available encrypted message in reason-
able time period. Therefore, these schemes are conditionally secured as it can be possible for the
adversary to get required computation power. The secret sharing based schemes, on the other hand,
do not assume about the computational power of the adversary. These schemes hide a secret by not
disclosing enough information about the secret to the adversary. Therefore, secret sharing schemes
provide better confidentiality than encryption-based schemes. Secret sharing schemes are typically
used to store highly important information such as cryptographic keys [23] [24], military data [25]
etc. Furthermore, without using an additional trick, secret sharing schemes can simultaneously pro-
vide data confidentiality, data integrity, and data availability. Therefore, we short-list secret sharing
schemes for our framework. Among the secret sharing schemes, Shamir’s secret sharing is more
efficient than other secret sharing schemes such as Blakley’s secret sharing and Chinese Reminder
Theorem-based secret sharing schemes. Therefore, we choose Shamir’s secret sharing for our work.
1.4.2 Addressing incompatibility of Shamir’s secret sharing with modular prime op-
eration
We address the incompatibility issue of Shamir’s secret sharing with a volume data/image process-
ing algorithm in two ways. First, similar to the parallel work of Finamore [26], we exclude the
modular prime operation from Shamir’s secret sharing [27]. This approach, however, can degrade
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security as the modified secret sharing no longer works in GF(q). Second, based on Catrina et al.’s
proposal [28], we modify the floating point operations of a volume data/image processing algo-
rithm to fixed point operations by modifying a floating point number to a fixed point number. This
technique, however, rounds off a floating point number, and therefore introduces round-off error.
1.4.3 Proposed frameworks
Our secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework [29] allows a datacenter to scale or
crop a hidden image such that the secret scaled/cropped image is recoverable from the hidden
scaled/cropped images. The core idea behind this framework is to use a (3, k, n) ramp secret image
sharing based on Shamir’s secret sharing [30], which is homomorphic to the addition and scalar
multiplication operations [22] used in the integer version of the bilinear scaling operation, to share
an image at the server side. To support image cropping without sending unwanted data to the user,
we preserve the pixel positions of the secret image in the shadow image; and to support bilinear
scaling, we do not use an additional non-homomorphic cryptosystem such as AES or watermarking
in conjunction with ramp secret sharing. To remove the correlation among pixels in a shadow im-
age, we use at least one random number in a secret sharing polynomial. The shared images (also
called shadow images), are then transmitted to the datacenters. Upon request from a user, a datacen-
ter scales/crops its shadow image, and sends the scaled/cropped image to the user. The user, upon
receiving at least k scaled/cropped shadow images, recovers the secret scaled/cropped image.
Our secure pre-classification volume ray-casting framework [27] [31] hides the color of volume
data from datacenters, and renders a color-hidden image from color-hidden data. The user, upon
receiving at least k hidden rendered images, recovers the secret rendered image. As Shamir’s secret
sharing is non-homomorphic to multiplication operations, this scheme, however, cannot hide the
opacities from the rendered images – therefore, disclosing the shape of the object. In this work,
we address the incompatibility issue of volume ray-casting with Shamir’s secret sharing by both
modifying secret sharing and modifying volume ray-casting. We call the former approach Secure
Rendering by Modification of Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SR-MSSS), and the latter approach Secure
Rendering by Modification of Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting (SR-MPVR). Both these tech-
niques, by creating three different color shares for the red, green, and blue color components, and
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by representing the share of a color component by a floating point number or by a large integer,
however, incur high data overhead to the user. For applications requiring minimal overhead at the
cost of high security, we propose a third technique called Secure Rendering by Ramp Secret Sharing
(SR-RSS) that improves upon SR-MSSS by first replacing modified Shamir’s secret sharing with a
modified (3, 4, 5) ramp secret sharing to create only one share for red, green, and blue colors, and
then restricting the value of a share (which is a floating point number) to a smaller number and
representing the restricted value with an integer.
Finally, assuming that Gouard Shading is used in ray-casting, we propose our secure cloud-based
rendering framework [32] that not only uses the popular post-classification volume ray-casting to
render volume data but also hides both the color and shape of an object from a datacenter. The
core idea is to distribute the ray-casting tasks among two groups of datacenters such that even
though rendering operations other than addition and scalar multiplication are not hidden, none of the
groups can know the volume data and rendered image. To hide the parts of the volume data/image
that are added and scalar multiplied, we use Shamir’s secret sharing. In this framework, a server
first performs the pre ray-projection operations of post-classification volume ray-casting, and then
creates n shares of the scalar values and n shares of the outputs of the pre ray-projection operations
(such as gradients and Phong illumination factors) using Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing. The shared
information is then sent to the first group of datacenters called the Interpolator. According to
a user’s request, the Interpolator first interpolates the shared scalars, shared gradients, and shared
Phong illumination factors; and then, by hiding the pixel positions, outsources the remaining volume
ray-casting operations, such as classification, shading, and composition, to the second group of
datacenters called the Compositor. After completing ray-casting, the Compositor transmits the
hidden image to the client, who recovers the secret image by recovering the secret pixel coordinates
and the secret colors of the pixels.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review previous works related
to ours and provide an overview of the techniques that we use in our work. Chapter 3 addresses
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
the incompatibility of Shamir’s secret sharing with floating point operations. Chapter 4 discusses
secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework. Chapter 5 discusses secure cloud-based
pre-classification volume ray-casting framework, and Chapter 6 discusses secure cloud-based post-
classification volume ray-casting framework. Chapter 7 concludes the work and proposes future
direction for further research
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we first review the research works related to cloud-based imaging, cryptographic
imaging, computation on hidden domain, and secure multi-party computation, and then provide an
overview of image scaling and volume data rendering algorithms.
2.1 Cloud-based Imaging
Recently, cloud-based imaging, due to its promise of better services such as low cost, high scala-
bility, availability, disaster recoverability etc., has drawn the attention of both academic researchers
and enterprises. The main application of this technique has been in the field of medical imag-
ing [10, 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 36, 36], where a datacenter is being used to store and process the
data/images of a patient. In the following sections, we provide a brief overview of cloud-based
medical imaging techniques.
2.1.1 Cloud-based data/image storage
To efficiently and cost effectively store medical images, researchers and enterprises are proposing
to move the entire picture archiving and communication system (PACS) of a hospital to cloud dat-
acenters [13, 33, 34, 35, 36]. For example, using Microsoft Windows Azure, Teng et al. proposed
a cloud-based PACS system that uses a DICOM sever to handle store/query/retreive requests, a DI-
COM image indexer to parse the metadata and store them in a SQL Azure database, and a web
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UI to allow searching and viewing of archived images [33]. Similarly, enterprises such as AT&T,
Accenture, FreedomPACS, SCImage etc. are offering cloud-based PACS systems.
Parallelly, the security and privacy issues of cloud-based image storage [13, 14, 37, 38] have also
been addressed in two possible scenarios: when a single datacenter is used, and when multiple data-
centers are used. In the case of the use of a single datacenter, public key encryption techniques,
such as watermarking, or chaos-based encryption, have been applied to protect the data/image
[15, 17, 39, 40]; and in the case of the use of multiple datacenters, a secret sharing scheme has
been used to distribute the secrecy among more than one datacenter [17]. For a complete list of ex-
isting cryptographic cloud storage systems, the reader can refer to AlZain et al.’s work [17], which
concludes that the secret sharing based cloud storage systems are more secure than the encryption
based systems.
2.1.2 Cloud-based data/image processing
Similar to cloud-based data/image storage, cloud-based data/image processing is also a growing
trend. Researchers and enterprises are actively proposing cloud-based volume data rendering frame-
works [10, 11, 12, 34] to render volume data. For example, using Azure cloud, Dorn et al. [11]
proposed an adaptive data rendering framework that, according to requirements, performs volume
ray-casting either in a cloud datacenter or at the client. By echoing the concerns of scalability
in server-side rendering and resource availability in client-side rendering, Vazhenin proposed yet
another cloud-based rendering framework [12]. Similarly, enterprises such as Sinha system [10],
KDDI Inc. [41], etc. have started offering cloud-based volume data rendering frameworks to hospi-
tals.
To the best of our knowledge, research on the security and privacy issues in cloud-based volume
data/image processing, however, is a little explored area.
2.2 Cryptosystems Applied on Image
In this section, we review existing cryptographic imaging techniques to find their ability to meet our
objective. In the next section, we survey existing volume data hiding techniques.
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So far, watermarking techniques [42, 43, 44], chaos-based encryption [45, 46], and visual secret
sharing schemes [47, 48] have been used to protect an image. Among these techniques, water-
marking [44] and chaos-based encryption (which uses permutation for the chaos) cannot support
arbitrary cropping of an image. Therefore, we exclude them from further study. Visual secret shar-
ing, which secret shares an image among n participants either by visual cryptography [48] or by the
application of threshold secret sharing schemes, however, can support cropping by hiding the color
of each pixel independently.
In the following, we review existing visual cryptography and threshold secret sharing based im-
age hiding schemes. Since three threshold secret sharing schemes, Shamir’s secret sharing [30],
Chinese remainder theorem-based secret sharing [49, 50], and Blakley secret sharing [23], are pop-
ular, we summarize each of them.
2.2.1 Visual cryptography
Visual cryptography, which was first proposed by Naor and Shamir [48], secret shares a binary
image by using two boolean matrices, one for a white pixel and other for a black pixel. A row
in a matrix acts as a share. The matrices are designed in such a way that the hamming weight of
OR-ed k rows (i.e., bitwise OR of k rows) of the black-pixel-matrix is more than a threshold, and
the hamming weight of OR-ed k rows of the white-pixel-matrix is less than the threshold. Since the
threshold determines the transparency of a pixel in the secret image, one can know a secret color by
knowing k or more rows of a matrix. The hamming weight of the vector obtained by OR-ing less
than k rows of the black-pixel-matrix, however, is the same as the hamming weight of the vector
obtained by OR-ing less than k rows of the white-pixel-matrix. Therefore, no information about a
secret color can be found from less than k rows.
Visual cryptography is very easy to implement, and can even reconstruct an image without re-
quiring a computer. Due to the use of binary matrices, visual cryptography, however, cannot support
the scaling of shadow images, since the addition of color shares, as required by the scaling opera-
tion, can produce undefined interpolated values. For example, in (2, 2) visual cryptography, if we
distribute a white pixel over two rows: {(1, 1), (1, 1)} and a black pixel over two rows: {(1, 0),
(0, 1)}, then the addition of the color of the two pixels will produce undefined shares: (10, 1) and
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(1, 10). Furthermore, the quality of the recovered image in visual cryptography is also a concern as
it approximates the secret image. Therefore, even though visual cryptography has been extended to
color images [51], we choose to exclude it from our work.
2.2.2 Blakley’s secret sharing, and its application in sharing an image
Blakley’s (k, n) secret sharing exploits a common geometric property that the intersection point of
any (k − 1)-degree non-parallel hyperplanes can be found only when k or more hyperplanes are
known. Therefore, if the secret(s) is/are hidden as the coordinate(s) of the intersection point, then
at least k hyperplanes, each of which can serve as a share, are required to know the secret. In the
following, we provide a brief overview of the share distribution step and the secret reconstruction
step.
Share distribution
Given k integers (x1, x2, . . . , xk), one or more of which are the secret, the jth hyperplane for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n, is defined as∑ki=1 xiaij = bj , where each aij is a random number. Each jth hyperplane
then serves as the jth share.
Secret reconstruction
Given the equations of any k hyperplanes, the coordinates of the intersection point of the hyper-
planes (and hence the secret) are found by solving k equations:
∑k
i=1 xiaij = bj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Using k colors as k coordinates of the intersecting points, researchers such as Tso [52] and
Bozkurt et al. [53] have proposed secret image sharing schemes based on Blakley’s scheme. Unlike
other secret image sharing schemes, secret image sharing based on Blakley’s scheme, however, is
not popular as Blakley’s scheme is not space efficient. In Blakley’s scheme, a participant must
store the aij’s and the bj independently. Therefore, we will exclude this scheme from our future
discussion.
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2.2.3 Secret sharing methods based on the Chinese Reminder Theorem, and their
application in sharing an image
To understand Chinese reminder theorem-based secret sharing, let us first understand how the Chi-
nese reminder theorem works.
The Chinese reminder theorem states that for a set of pairwise relatively prime moduli (q1, q2, . . . , qn),
there exists a unique integer x for any given n residues (r1, r2, . . . , rn) such that the congruences
x = r1 mod q1
x = r2 mod q2
...
x = rn mod qn
are satisfied. Thus, to find the value of x, first, the products of qi’s are calculated as q =
∏n
i=1 qi;
second, for each i, the multiplicative inverse of qi, denoted as Ii, is calculated as Ii = ( qqi )
−1 mod
qi; and finally, x is calculated as x =
∑n
i=1 ri × qqi × Ii.
Using the Chinese reminder theorem, there are two main secret sharing schemes: Mignotte’s
scheme [49] and Asumuth Bloom’s scheme [50]. Based on these two versions of secret sharing,
there are two corresponding secret image sharing schemes.
Mignotte’s secret sharing scheme
Mignotte’s (k, n) secret sharing scheme uses a special sequence of moduli q1, q2, . . . qn called
Mignotte’s sequence that satisfies the condition q1 < q2 < · · · < qn, and the condition
∏k−2
i=0 qn−i <∏k
i=1 qi. The secret S, which satisfies the condition
∏k−2
i=0 qn−i < S <
∏k
i=1 qi, is then shared by
the equation Si = S mod qi, where Si is the ith share for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Given any k shares,
the secret S is reconstructed using the Chinese reminder theorem on k equations: x = Si mod qi,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Using Mignotte’s scheme, Jian and Chen [54] proposed a secret image sharing scheme that first
XOR-ed the color of each pixel with a random number to break the spatial coherence, and then ap-
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plied Mignotte’s scheme on the XOR-ed color value. To reconstruct a secret, this scheme, therefore
requires the random seed (to obtain the number that was XOR-ed with the secret) that was used
during share creation phase. Furthermore, this scheme is not a perfectly secure scheme [55]. In
other words, this scheme can disclose some information about the secret to a group of less than k
participants. Therefore, we do not consider this scheme for our frameworks.
Asumuth Bloom’s secret sharing scheme
Similar to Mignotte’s, Asmuth and Bloom’s (k, n) secret sharing also uses a special sequence of
moduli q0, q2, . . . , qn, called the Asmuth Bloom sequence, that satisfies the condition q0
∏k−2
i=0 qn−i <∏k
i=1 qi. Given a secret S ∈ Zq0 , the shares of S are then obtained by the equation Si = (S +
α.q0) mod qi (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n), where α is a random number satisfying S + α.q0 ≤ q1q2 . . . qk.
Given any k shares S1, S2, . . . , Sk, the secret S is obtained by applying the Chinese reminder
theorem on k sets of equations: x = Si mod qi, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Based on Asmuth and Bloom’s scheme, Ulutas et al. [56] proposed an image sharing scheme that
broke the spatial coherence of an image by using different values of α to share the color values of
different pixels. Although this scheme does not need random seeds and is perfectly secured, it is
infrequently used as it is difficult to implement.
2.2.4 Shamir’s secret sharing, and its application in sharing an image
Shamir’s (k, n) (where, k ≤ n) secret sharing is based on mathematical interpolation. To hide a
secret, this scheme uses a (k − 1)-degree polynomial whose zero-th degree coefficient is the secret.
Using this polynomial, n shares of the secret are created by assigning n different values to the
variable in the polynomial. Each share is then sent to a participant. When the shares of at least k
participants are known, the polynomial is reconstructed by Lagrange interpolation, and the secret is
found. In the following, we provide a mathematical overview of the share distribution and secret
reconstruction steps. Next, we review some properties of Shamir’s secret sharing.
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Given k distinct share numbers {x0, x1, . . . xk−1} and shares {y0, y1, . . . yk−1} such that
yi = F (xi),











is called the Lagrange basis function. By the Unisolvence theorem, L(x) = F (x). Thus, the secret
a0 can be obtained by setting x = 0 in L(x).
Theorem 1. (Unisolvence Theorem) Given k points {(x0, y0),
(x1, y1), . . . , (xk−1, yk−1)} in GF(q) with mutually different xi, there exists a unique polynomial
L(x) ∈ GF (q)[x] of at most k − 1 degree such that L(xi) = yi, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
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Properties
Shamir’s secret sharing is homomorphic to addition and scalar multiplication [22] – the two basic
operations required in image processing. In other words, multiple secrets can be combined by direct
addition and/or scalar multiplication on their shares. For example, if the participants are holding
shares of a set of secrets S = {S1, S2, ..., Sj}, then without communicating amongst themselves,
they can compute the shares of the secret
∑j
i=1 IiSi, where Ii is an integer.
Similar to Blakley’s scheme and Asumuth Bloom’s scheme, Shamir’s scheme is perfectly secured
(i.e., any combination of less than k shares disclose zero information about the secret). Mignotte’s
scheme is not perfectly secured. Similar to Asumuth Bloom’s scheme, Shamir’s scheme is an ideal
secret sharing scheme, since the size of a share can be restricted to be equal to the size of the secret.
Blakley’s scheme is not an ideal secret sharing scheme. With comparison to Asumuth Bloom’s
scheme, Shamir’s scheme requires less number of operations in secret reconstruction phase. There-
fore, we use Shamir’s secret sharing in our frameworks.
Shamir’s secret sharing has also been used to securely multiply or divide a fixed number of
shares [28, 57]. Typically, the division is performed as multiplication using the Newton Raphson
method or Goldschmidt’s scheme. Since our framework cannot fix the number of multiplications
beforehand, we, however, do not use these schemes.
To protect a secret, Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing, requires disk space of n times the size of a
share (as a share’s size is equal to the secret’s size).
To decrease the high storage requirement, a variant of Shamir’s secret sharing called ramp secret
sharing (or multi-secret sharing) is used [58, 59]. Ramp secret sharing uses l secrets as l coefficients
in a secret sharing polynomial, and therefore decreases the size requirement by 1l times. Thus, ramp
secret sharing is typically used in secret image sharing. Ramp secret sharing, however, is not a
perfectly secure scheme [58, 59], and it provides a tradeoff between the size and the security: the
higher the value of l, the smaller the size of the resulting shares and the lower the level of security,
and vice-versa.
Shamir’s secret sharing, however, uses the modular prime operation, and therefore can neither
share a floating point number nor perform floating point operations on the shares.
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This issue can be addressed by either of two approaches: by omitting the modular prime operation
from Shamir’s secret sharing, or by representing a floating point number as a fixed point number
(e.g., by first rounding off the floating point number by d decimal places, and then multiplying 10d
by it). The former approach is parallelly proposed by ourselves [27] and Finamore [26], and the
latter is proposed by Catrina et al [28]. The use of any of these scheme, however, introduces a
tradeoff as the exclusion of the modular prime operation from secret sharing weakens the security,
and the fixed point representation of a floating point number introduces round-off error.
Alternatively, Chor et al. proposed a secret sharing scheme that can share a floating point num-
ber [60] without producing any side-effects. The main idea of this scheme is to share a secret
S ∈ R, where Smin ≤ S ≤ Smax, to n shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn in such a way that for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, each Si ∈ R is randomly chosen from the interval [Smin, Smax], and Sn sat-
isfies
∑n
i=1 Si = S (mod Smax). This scheme, however, is non-homomorphic to floating point
additions and scalar multiplications.
Secret image sharing based on Shamir’s scheme
Secret image sharing based on Shamir’s secret sharing is a thoroughly studied area [47, 61, 62, 63,
64, 65, 66, 67]. However, existing works assume that a participant (a shadow image holder) does
not process the stored shadow image, and therefore focus on two main issues: how to decrease the
size and how to increase the security of a shadow image. To decrease the size of a shadow image,
(k, k, n) ramp secret sharing [58], which uses k color values {C0, C1, . . . , Ck−1} as secrets in a






(where q is a prime number), has been proposed [47, 61, 62, 63, 64]. The use of a (k, k, n) ramp
secret sharing technique, however, can disclose the spatial coherence of the secret image in a shadow
image (as shown in Figure 2.1), as a number of F (x)’s defined from a set of coherent color values
can produce similar results [61]. Therefore, researchers have proposed to couple (k, k, n) ramp
secret sharing with permutation [47], chaotic map [62], stenography [63] and matrix projection [61]
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2.1: Shadow images created by the (3, 3, 5) ramp secret sharing technique that uses the R,
G, B values of a pixel in F (x): (a) is the secret image; and (b), (c), (d) are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd shadow
images, respectively. As F (x) maps the R, G, B values to only one value, which is the color of a
pixel of the shadow image, the shadow images are gray colored.
etc. to increase the security of the shadow image. The integration of these techniques with secret
sharing, however, can destroy the homomorphic property of secret sharing (for example, when
matrix projection or stenography are used) or randomize the pixel positions of the secret image (for
example, when permutation or chaotic map are used). To hide the spatial coherence without using
an additional technique, Alharthi and Atrey [64] recently proposed to use different share numbers to
share the colors of different pixels. Similar to the other methods, the resulting secret sharing scheme
is no longer homomorphic.
2.3 Cryptosystems Applied on Volume data
Research in hiding volume data is not as widespread as the hiding of images. So far, non-homomorphic
digital watermarking techniques based on 3D-DWT and 3D-DCT [68], and the secret sharing tech-
nique [69] have been mainly proposed to hide volume data. However, even if we can use other
cryptographic techniques such as AES, DES, ElGamal cryptosystem etc., unlike secret sharing,
none of them are unconditionally secure, homomorphic to addition and scalar multiplication, and
result in less computational overhead simultaneously [20].
2.4 Computation in Hidden Domain
Evolution in cloud computing has made computation in hidden domain a necessity highly desirable.
Ideally, this requirement can be met when outsourced data/images are protected by a cryptosystem
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 22
that is homomorphic to the performed computations. For example, in theory, Gentry’s lattice-based
fully homomorphic scheme [70] can secure any cloud-based computation. However, this scheme
is far from being used in practice as it’s implementation is inefficient [18, 19, 71], and it cannot
guarantee the correctness of computations [71]. As a result, researchers are proposing application-
specific solutions.
Processing in hidden domain mainly can be divided into two groups: schemes using secure multi-
party computation, and schemes those do not use secure multi-party computation.
The secure multi-party computation-based schemes distributes the processing among a number
of participants in such a way that none of the participant can know more information than it requires.
Using this method, Li et al. studied how to search encrypted cloud data [72, 73, 74], Wang et al.
proposed a scheme to securely outsource linear programming to cloud datacenters [75], and various
other researchers studied the feasibility of securing cloud-based e-voting, data mining, auctions
etc [76, 77, 78, 79].
The non-secure multi-party-based schemes typically use somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems
to secure operations that are homomorphic to the used cryptosystem. For example, Erkin et al. used
two semantically secure additively homomorphic public-key encryption schemes: Paillier cryp-
tosystem and DGK cryptosystem, to perform face recognition in hidden domain [80]. Their scheme
involves two parties: Alice and Bob, where Alice owns a face image and Bob owns an image
database. Both Alice and Bob want to run a face recognition algorithm to determine whether Alice’s
face image matches with any image in the Bob’s database without disclosing information to one an-
other. This scheme, however, is less suitable for third-party outsourcing since Bob, the third-party
service provider, must interact with Alice, the server, during the execution of non-homomorphic
operations. This shortcoming, however, can be avoided by exploiting the property of a specific
algorithm, and by using simple data hiding techniques, such as obfuscation, in addition to a some-
what homomorphic cryptosystems. For example, Ayday et al. proposed a distributed architecture
that uses Paillier cryptosystem and obfuscation to distribute the processing of genomic data among
a number of participants such that none of the participant can get enough information to identify the
owner of data [81]. Their solution, however, is similar to secure multi-party computation.
As our work is based on secure multi-party computation, we will review it in the next section.
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Readers interested in other schemes, and willing to get a list of applications that are using hidden
domain processing, are referred to a recent tutorial by Lagendijk et al. [82].
2.5 Secure Multi-Party Computation
In the early eighties, Yao first introduced the concept of secure multi-party computation by introduc-
ing the Millionaire Problem [83], which recognized the richest millionaire among two millionaires
without disclosing the wealth of either of the millionaires. This work, although only limited to the
comparison operation, introduced the concept of secure multiparty computation: the problem of
distributing the computation of a function among n participants such that none of the participants
can get more information than their input and the output of the computation. In a follow up work,
Yao proposed a grabbled circuit-based generalized two-party secure computation protocol [84] that
served as the basis for numerous further research [85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92]. This research can
be classified into two main categories [89]: secret sharing-based schemes and binary circuit-based
schemes.
The secret sharing-based schemes distribute the secret among a number of participants, and allow
simple arithmetic operations such as addition and scalar multiplication on the hidden data. These
schemes are mainly used in secure e-voting [85], threshold signature [86], data mining [87] etc.
This approach has also been successfully applied to securely auction farmers’ bids in the Danish
sugar beet industry [88].
On the other hand, the binary circuit-based approaches [84, 91], which are so far of interest to
theorists, work on the principle of first representing any function as a binary circuit (a collection of
logical gates), and then securely computing the binary circuit. To understand how the computation
of a binary circuit is secured, let us take the example of Yao’s grabbled construction for a single
gate. Assume that one input of a gate is held by Participant A, and another is held by Participant B.
Yao’s construction hides the input of Participant B from Participant A by not disclosing Participant
B’s input to Participant A, and hides the input of Participant A from Participant B by encrypting Par-
ticipant A’s input. The output is also double encrypted using the input-keys (i.e., the cryptographic
keys which replace the actual inputs) of both Participant A and Participant B as public keys. In this
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construction, Participant A first finds cryptographic keys for all four possible inputs of the gate, and
then uses these keys to double encrypt the real outputs. The encrypted outputs and the encrypted
inputs are then permuted to hide the input order, and the permuted table is sent to Participant B with
the input key of Participant A. Finally, Participant B decrypts the output using their input-key and
Participant A’s input-key.
Binary circuit-based schemes, however, are inefficient for arithmetic operations as they are per-
formed in the binary domain. These schemes, can however, efficiently perform the comparison
operations as required in secure online auctioning, verification of the correctness of outsourced
computations, etc. Therefore, researchers have recently started to propose practical binary circuit-
based secure multiparty computation schemes [90, 93, 89].
However, to the best of our knowledge, secure multi-party computation has not yet been applied
for image scaling/cropping or scientific visualization. In this thesis, we are the first to study the
feasibility of using Shamir’s secret sharing-based secure multiparty computation for image scal-
ing/cropping and for volume ray-casting, and are among a handful of researchers to propose practi-
cal secure cloud-based multiparty frameworks.
2.6 Volume Data Rendering and 2D Image Scaling
In this section, we will review image scaling and volume data rendering techniques since we use
them in our work.
2.6.1 Image scaling
An image is typically scaled by bilinear or bicubic interpolation. As our work uses bilinear interpo-
lation, we summarize it below.
Bilinear interpolation
Given the color values {C0, C1, C2, C3} of any four pixels and two scaling factors 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ w ≤ 1 along the height and width of the image, bilinear interpolation finds the interpolated






where D0 = (1− w)(1− h), D1 = (1− w)h, D2 = w(1− h), and D3 = wh. We call Di the ith
interpolating factor.
2.6.2 Volume data rendering
Volume rendering, or 3D data rendering, renders 3D image either from a 3D volumetric data or from
a set of 2D images. Depending on the input, existing 3D rendering algorithms are classified into two
main categories: direct volume rendering, which inputs volume; and surface rendering, which inputs
a 2D image set. This thesis focuses on direct volume rendering as this technique produces better
quality images [94]. Among the direct volume rendering techniques, such as volume ray-casting,
splatting, and shear wrapping, volume ray-casting is commonly used [8].
The main idea behind volume ray-casting is to project rays from each pixel of the image space on
a 3D object, and find the color and opacity along each ray by mapping the physical properties of the
object to optical properties (i.e., color and opacity). This idea is executed in a number of indepen-
dent rendering components such as: gradient and normal estimation, classification, shading, ray-
projection, sampling, interpolation, and composition. These components are typically arranged in
two different pipelines: the pre-classification volume ray-casting pipeline and the post-classification
volume ray-casting pipeline [95] [96].
Pre-classification volume ray-casting
Pre-classification volume ray-casting renders given volume data V = {vi,j,k|vi,j,k is the ijkth
data voxel} in the pipeline: gradient and normal estimation, classification, shading, ray-projection,
sampling, interpolation, and composition.
Gradient and Normal Estimation: Given the scalar value Pvi,j,k of vi,j,k, this step finds the gradi-
ent Gvi,j,k = (G
x
vi,j,k
, Gyvi,j,k , G
z
vi,j,k
) and the normal Nvi,j,k of vi,j,k by















Classification: This step finds the color C
↑
v and the opacity Av of a data voxel v ∈ V from a
given look-up table indexed by Pv.
Shading: Given the ambient coefficient ka, diffuse coefficient kd, specular coefficient ks, specular










are called Phong illumination factors.
Ray Projection: In this step, rays from the pixels of the image space are projected on V .
Sampling: This step samples a projected ray at c sample points s1, s2, ..., sc.
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Interpolation: This step computes the color Cs and the opacity As of a sample point s by inter-
polating the colors and the opacities of N(s), eight neighbouring voxels of s. Mathematically, Cs










where Cv ∈ N and Av ∈ R are the color and opacity of v, and Dv ∈ R is the interpolating factor of
v. The interpolating factor Dv is calculated from the xyz-coordinate of s and the xyz-coordinates
of the voxels v ∈ N(s).
We know that Cv satisfies
0 ≤ Cv ≤ 255, (2.4)
and Dv satisfies
0 ≤ Dv ≤ 1, (2.5a)∑
v∈N(s)
Dv = 1. (2.5b)
Thus, by putting Inequality 2.4 and Inequality 2.5 in Equation 2.2, we conclude
0 ≤ Cs ≤ 255. (2.6)
Similarly, Av is defined as
0 ≤ Av ≤ 1. (2.7)
Therefore, by putting Inequality 2.5 and Inequality 2.7 in Equation 2.3, we conclude
0 ≤ As ≤ 1. (2.8)
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Composition: In this step, the colors and opacities of the sample points along a ray are accumu-
lated to produce the composited color and the composited opacity. Mathematically, the composited


















By putting Inequality 2.8 in Equation 2.11, Oi ∈ R satisfies
0 ≤ Oi ≤ 1. (2.12)
Furthermore, we know that A ≤ 1. Therefore, by Equation 2.10, Oi also satisfies
c∑
i=1
Oi ≤ 1. (2.13)
Now, by putting Inequality 2.6, Inequality 2.12, and Inequality 2.13 in Equation 2.9, we conclude
0 ≤ C ≤ 255. (2.14)
Furthermore, by Inequality 2.9 and Inequality 2.12, composite color C satisfies C ∈ R. We,
however, know that the color of a pixel is a whole number. Therefore, the composite C is truncated
to obtain the final color.
Post-classification volume ray-casting
Post-classification volume ray-casting renders a volume V in a pipeline: gradient and normal es-
timation, ray-projection, sampling, interpolation, classification, shading, and composition. When
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Gouard shading is used, the Phong illumination factors, however, are calculated before the pro-
jection of the rays. We use Gouard shading. Thus, we will discuss post-classification volume
ray-casting with Gouard shading.
Gradient and Normal Estimation: Similar to pre-classification, this step calculates the gradient
Gv and the normal Nv of a voxel v ∈ V .
Calculation of Illumination Factors: Similar to pre-classification, this step calculates the Phong
illumination factors Yv and Zv of v.
Ray Projection: In this step, rays from each pixel of the image spaces are projected on V .
Sampling: In this step, a projected ray is sampled at c sample points s1, s2, ..., sc.
Interpolation: In this step, the scalar value and gradient of a sample point s are calculated by
interpolating the scalar values and gradients of the eight neighbouring voxels of s. Mathematically,





where Pv ∈ N is the scalar value of v and Dv ∈ R is the interpolating factor of v.
Classification: In this step, the classified color C
↑
s and the classified opacity As of s are found
from the given look-up tables by using Ps and Gs as indices.

















Composition: Similar to the composition step of pre-classification volume ray-casting, this step
computes the color C and opacity A along a ray by accumulating the colors and opacities of all c
sample points.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we first discussed about the growing demand for practical secure cloud-based
data/image processing systems, and the inability of exiting homomorphic cryptosystems to meet the
requirement. Then, we argued that secure multi-party computation can be an alternative to homo-
morphic schemes to securely process data/image at a datacenter. To find the best suited secure multi-
party computation scheme for our requirement, we reviewed the grabbled circuit method, Bakley’s
secret sharing method, Chinese Reminder Theorem-based secret sharing method, and Shamir’s se-
cret sharing method in detail, and chosen Shamir’s secret sharing-based secure multi-part computa-
tion method. Finally, we provided a brief overview of three commonly used data/image processing
algorithms: bilinear image scaling, pre-classification volume ray-casting, and post-classification
volume ray-casting, which are considered in the thesis.
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Chapter 3
Using Floating Point Numbers in
Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Shamir’s Secret Sharing operates in a finite field by performing modular prime operations. Typi-
cally, an image processing algorithm, such as image scaling/cropping and volume ray-casting, per-
forms floating point numbers. Since floating point numbers are incompatible with modular prime
operations, Shamir’s secret sharing cannot be used in conjunction with an image processing algo-
rithm.
To address the incompatibility of Shamir’s secret sharing with a floating point number, in this
chapter, we discuss two approaches: the exclusion of the modular prime operation from secret
sharing, and the conversion of a floating point number to a fixed point number. The former approach
is parallelly proposed by us [27] and Finamore [26], and the later approach is proposed by Catrina
et al. [28]. However, due to the exclusion of modular prime operation from secret sharing, there can
be loss in security; and due to rounding a floating point number to convert it to an integer, there can
be rounding error. We study the effect of removing modular prime operation from Shamir’s secret
sharing, and analyzes the rounding error in the later approach.
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3.1 Exclusion of the Modular Prime Operation
Similar to the work of Finamore [26], we exclude the modular prime operation from Shamir’s
secret sharing to make it compatible with floating point operations. The modified secret sharing
polynomial is defined as










We use this modified secret sharing for our SR-MSSS and SR-RSS schemes of secure pre-
classification framework (Chapter 5).
Due to the exclusion of the modular prime operation, a cryptosystem, however, no longer works
in a finite field. Therefore, the modified cryptosystem can lose security. In the following, we discuss
the security loss.
3.1.1 Security analysis of the modified Shamir’s secret sharing
To analyze the security of the modified secret sharing method, one must first understand how
Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing hides a secret.
To hide a secret, Shamir’s secret sharing exploits the condition that to know a (k − 1)-degree
polynomial F ′(x), the knowledge of at least k F ′(xi)’s is required. The uncertainty in finding the
polynomial from less than k F ′(xi)’s varies with the number of F ′(xi)’s. The higher the number
of known F ′(xi)’s, the less uncertainty there is. For example, suppose that we are given a share
F ′(xi) = 9 for a share number xi = 1, and are told that F ′(x) is a second degree polynomial.
Then, we can find the equation
∑2
i=0 ai1
i = 9, which is satisfied by 55 sets of (a0, a1, a2). Thus,
a0 can take 55 possible values with the knowledge of xi = 1 and F ′(1) = 9. Now, suppose that




i = 22. In anticipation of knowing the coefficients ai’s, we now subtract
two known equations, and get a new equation a1 + 3a2 = 13. This resultant equation is satisfied by
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five possible pairs of (a1, a2), and for these values of (a1, a2), there exists a maximum of five a0’s
satisfying any F ′(x). Thus, the secret can now take 5 possible values. To counter this fluctuation
in range of possible values, Shamir’s secret sharing uses the modular prime operation. By not using
modular prime operation, we remove this security shield.
However, even without the modular prime operation, there exists uncertainty to knowing a secret
in the modified secret sharing scheme. To obtain a relationship between this uncertainty with the
knowledge of the value of k, the value of share number xi, and the value of share F ′(xi), we provide
the following formulas.
Let us start with k = 2, i.e., from a first degree polynomial F ′(x) = a0 + a1x, and assume that
one F ′(xi) is known. Clearly, for each value of a0, there exists only one a1xi that can satisfy the
equation F ′(xi) = a0 + a1xi. Therefore, if we can obtain possible values of a1 (note that xi is
already known), then we can obtain the number of possible values of a0. We, however, know that
both a0 and a1 are positive integers satisfying 0 ≤ a0 ≤ F ′(xi) and 0 ≤ a1xi ≤ F ′(xi). Thus,
a1 can only take values from the range [0,
F ′(xi)
xi





















With an increase in the value of k > 3, the value of T increases as the combination of k − 1
coefficients that satisfy a k− 2 degree polynomial F ′,k−2(x, S) is also part of the combination of k
coefficients that satisfy the k − 1 degree polynomial F ′,k−2(x, S) + ak−1xk−1.
Hence, the number of choices to know the secret can be sufficiently large. For example, even in
the extreme case of k = 2, xi = 1, and F ′(xi) = 1, the value of T is two: equal to the number of
choices in the case of Shamir’s original secret sharing.
Now let us consider the case when l number (where 1 < l < k) of F ′(xi)’s are known. In
this case, one can get a polynomial of k − l degree by solving the F ′(xi)’s. Based on the above
arguments, the resultant polynomial involves some degree of uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty,
however, increases with an increase in the value of l.
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The uncertainty of knowing F ′(x) from the knowledge of F ′(xi) and xi is higher when the value
of F ′(xi) is higher for a fixed xi or when the value of xi is lower for a fixed F ′(xi). Therefore, we
recommend using a smaller xi and a higher ai.
However, by not using a modular prime operation, the modified secret sharing may be prone to
side-channel attacks. This thesis leaves the investigation of a side channel attack on the modified
secret sharing as an open problem.
3.2 Modifying a Floating Point Number to a Fixed Point Number
In this approach, we propose to address the incompatibility issue of Shamir’s secret sharing with
a floating point number by converting the floating point numbers to fixed point numbers. A float
a0 can be converted to a fixed point number by first rounding a0 by d decimal places, and then
multiplying bn (where, b ∈ N) to the rounded off value. In this thesis, we choose b = 10. Catrina et
al. [28] proposed a similar scheme by choosing b = 2.
In other words, to convert a floating point number a0 to a fixed point number a
(d)
0 , we first round-
off a0 by using Definition 1, and then multiply 10d by Round(a0, d).
Definition 1. IfR = I.N1N2N3 . . . Nd . . . , is a floating point number, where 0 ≤ I ≤ 9, 0 ≤ Ni ≤
9, and d ∈ N, then the value of Round(R, d) is defined as
Round(R, d) =

I.N1N2N3 . . . Nd, if Nd+1 < 5
I.N1N2N3 . . . (Nd + 1), if Nd+1 > 5
I.N1N2N3 . . . Nd, if Nd+1 = 5, Nd is an even number, and for each
t > d+ 1, Nt = 0
I.N1N2N3 . . . (Nd + 1), if Nd+1 = 5, Nd is an odd number, and for each
t > d+ 1, Nt = 0
I.N1N2N3 . . . (Nd + 1), if Nd+1 = 5 and there exists at least one t > d+ 1
such that Nt > 0
.
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Thus, a(d)0 is defined as
a
(d)
0 = (a0 + d)× 10d,
where d is the round-off error. This error is analyzed in the next section.
We use this scheme for our secure image scaling/cropping framework (Chapter 4), SR-MPVR
scheme of secure pre-classification framework (Chapter 5), and secure post-classification frame-
work (Chapter 6).
3.2.1 Error analysis
Proposition 1. If d is the error resulting from rounding off a given floating point number by d
decimal places, then the lower bound of d, which is −0.5 × 10−d, is obtained when: (i) the value
of the dth decimal place digit of the floating point number is an even number, (ii) the value of the
(d+1)th decimal place digit of the floating point number is five, and (iii) the value of each (d+ t)th
(where, t > 1) decimal place digit of the floating point number is zero.
Proposition 2. If d is the error resulting from rounding off a given floating point number by d
decimal places, then the upper bound of d, which is 0.5 × 10−d, is obtained when: (i) the value
of the dth decimal place digit of the floating point number is an odd number, (ii) the value of the
(d+1)th decimal place digit of the floating point number is five, and (iii) the value of each (d+ t)th
(where, t > 1) decimal place digit of the floating point number is zero.
Claim 1. If K is scalar and R is a floating point number, then the error due to K × Round(R, d)
is bounded by ±0.5K × 10−d.
Claim 2. If R1 and R2 are two floating point numbers, then the error due to Round(R1, d) +
Round(R2, f) is bounded by ±(0.5× 10−d + 0.5× 10−f ).
Corollary 1. If Ki and Ri are the ith scalar and ith floating point number respectively, then the
error due to
∑c




Proof. Proven by Claim 1 and Claim 2.
CHAPTER 3. USING FLOATING POINT NUMBERS IN SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING 36
3.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we discussed two methods to address the incompatibility of the floating point op-
eration of a data/image processing algorithm with the modular prime operation of Shamir’s secret
sharing. The first method removes the modular prime operation from secret sharing, and the second
method converts a floating point number to a fixed point number by first rounding off the floating
point number by d decimal places and then multiplying 10d to the rounded off value. We showed
that the exclusion of modular prime operation from secret sharing can weaken the security of secret





In this chapter, we propose the secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework that hides
important images at datacenters, but allows image scaling and cropping on noise-like hidden images
such that the processed secret image can be recovered from the processed hidden images. This
requirement has arisen from the trend of servers such as hospitals wanting to outsource the storage
and the processing of images to third-party datacenters without disclosing the content of images.
A naive solution to our requirement would be for the server to create multiple secret images
at different resolutions (to support scaling), and to divide each secret image into independently
decodable tiles (to support cropping). Each tile could then be hidden by applying a cryptosystem,
and the hidden tiles could be sent to datacenters. When users request a region of an image at
a particular scale, each datacenter could send the hidden tiles that overlap with the region at the
nearest resolution to the user. Such a solution, however, could cause additional data to be sent to the
user.
Therefore, we decided to directly scale and crop a hidden image. We assumed that scaling is
performed by bilinear interpolation. Thus, we required a cryptosystem that is homomorphic to
addition and scalar multiplication. Hence, we used Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing. The main idea
of our scheme is to secret share an image at the server side and send n noise-like shadow images to
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n datacenters, allow the datacenters to perform image scaling and cropping operations on shadow
images, and recover the processed secret image from k processed shadow images. As discussed
in Section 2.2.4, existing secret image sharing schemes, however, cannot fulfill our requirement as
they destroy the homomorphic property of Shamir’s secret sharing. Therefore, we propose a new
secret image sharing scheme.
4.1 A New Secret Image Sharing Scheme
To allow scaling on shadow images, we need to keep the homomorphic property of secret sharing,
and to allow cropping without sending extra bits of data, we need to keep the pixel position of secret
image intact in the shadow image. Therefore, unlike existing works, we cannot use an additional
cryptosystem in conjunction with secret sharing. As a result, as shown in Figure 2.1, information
about the image can be leaked. Such information loss occurs due to the fact that existing secret
image sharing schemes cannot break the spatial coherence of an image.
We observed that the spatial coherence in a shadow image can be broken if correlation among the
adjacent pixels of the secret image can be destroyed. The inter-pixel correlation can be destroyed
if the results of the secret sharing polynomials of neighboring pixels can be different. Existing
secret image sharing schemes do not fulfill this requirement as they use the colors of pixels as all
the coefficients in a secret sharing polynomial. We propose to use at least one random number as a
coefficient in our secret sharing polynomial.
Furthermore, we also observe that to facilitate dynamic cropping, the pixel positions of the secret
image must be kept unchanged in a shadow image. Therefore, we do not use the color values of one
pixel in the secret sharing polynomial of another pixel. As a result, we are left with three choices (as
the color of a pixel is represented by three components: red (R), green (G), and blue (B)): the use of
one color component, the use of two color components, or the use of three color components in the
definition of a secret sharing polynomial. These options, which are different cases of ramp secret
sharing, provide tradeoffs between the security and the size of the shadow image: the first being
most secure (as it uses only one secret in the secret sharing polynomial [58]) but resulting in the
largest shadow image size (as it creates three different shares per pixel by using three secret sharing
CHAPTER 4. SECURE CLOUD-BASED IMAGE SCALING/CROPPING 39
polynomials) and the last being the least secure but resulting the smallest size. We choose the last
option and design the randomized ramp secret image sharing method by defining a polynomial F (x)
of a (3, k, n) (where, 4 ≤ k ≤ n) ramp secret sharing technique as





where, each ai is a random number satisfying 1 ≤ ai < q for at least one i and 0 ≤ ai < q for other
i’s. As shown in Figure 4.3, randomized ramp secret image sharing produces noise-like shadow
images.
Note that although randomized ramp secret image sharing is designed for color images, it can be
adjusted for gray images by using the gray color as the only secret in F (x).
4.1.1 Supporting bilinear scaling
Recall that although bilinear interpolation performs addition and scalar multiplication operations
that are supported by Shamir’s secret sharing homomorphism [22], it involves floating point oper-
ations, which are incompatible with the modular prime operation of Shamir’s secret sharing. To
make bilinear interpolation compatible with the modular prime operation, we therefore convert its
floating point operations to fixed point operations by converting its floating point operands to fixed
point operands. As discussed in Section 2.6.1, an interpolating factor Di is the only floating point
number in the bilinear interpolation. Therefore, we represent Di by a fixed point number
D
(d)
i = (Di + Di,d)× 10d, (4.1)
where Di,d is the round-off error.
By replacing each Di with D
(d)
i in Equation 2.1, we find the scaled color C
′










Ci(Di + Di,d)× 10d (by Equation 4.1)










= (Cs + Cs)× 10d, (by Equation 2.1) (4.2)





is the scaling error.
Given that the color of each pixel Ci satisfies 0 ≤ Ci ≤ 255, by using Corollary 1, Cs can be
calculated to be −510 × 10−d ≤ Cs ≤ 510 × 10−d. Furthermore, we know that the scaled color
Cs also satisfies 0 ≤ C ≤ 255. Therefore we can conclude that C ′s satisfies
(255− 510× 10−d)× 10d ≤ C ′s ≤ (255 + 510× 10−d)× 10d. (4.3)
Note that by rounding off the interpolating factors by d decimal places, we restrict the maximum
number of scaled images to 10d − 1. However, as the maximum number of decimal places that
an interpolating factor can take is restricted in a computer, one can choose d to be large enough
to cover all possible scaled images. Therefore, we can claim that the proposed modified bilinear
interpolation provides a sufficiently large number of scaled images.
4.2 Scaling/Cropping an Image in Hidden Domain
We now describe how we will use the new secret image sharing scheme in scaling/cropping an
image in hidden domain. Figure 4.1 shows the three components of our framework: the image
source (which is the server), n datacenters, and the user. This framework has been designed with
the assumptions that: (i) the image source and the user are trusted entities, (ii) the datacenters do
not communicate confidential information among themselves, and (iii) an adversary cannot access
more that k − 1 datacenters.
As shown in Figure 4.2, a typical workflow of storing and recovering an image can be divided
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Figure 4.1: Secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping.
into four steps: (i) shadow image preparation, (ii) image scale/crop request, (iii) shadow image
scaling/cropping, and (iv) secret image recovery.
4.2.1 Shadow image preparation
In the first step, the server creates n shadow images by applying our secret image sharing technique
on the secret image. Thus, it computes Fi(x) for each pixel i of the secret image for n different
values of x.
To define a Fi(x), we need to pick a prime number q that is greater than the reconstructed secret.
In our case, the reconstructed secret, which can be C ′s (when the shared color values are interpo-
lated), has the maximum value of (255+510×10−d)×10d (by Equation 4.3). Therefore, the server
must choose q greater than (255 + 510× 10−d)× 10d. Furthermore, the shares of the color values
that are added together must belong to one GF(q). As the server has no prior knowledge of which
of the shared colors will be added, it can use one q for all the polynomials. In finding the value of
q, the server also needs to fix the value of d in this step.
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Figure 4.2: Workflow of secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework: (a) shadow image
preparation, (b) scaling/cropping of pth shadow image, (c) recovery of secret scaled image, (d)
recovery of secret cropped image.
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where Ri, Gi, and Bi are the colors of the pixel, αi,x =
∑k−1
j=3 ai,jx
j , and ai,j are randomly chosen
integers. Using this polynomial, the pth share of all three colors can be found by









j . The pth (for all 1 ≤ p ≤ n) shadow image is then constructed with
Ci,p as the color value of its ith pixel. This shadow image is sent to the pth datacenter. As shown in
Figure 4.3, a shadow image is a noise-like image, and therefore, it does not disclose any information
about the secret image to the datacenter.
4.2.2 Shadow image scaling/cropping
When a user requests to view an image, it will supply the datacenters with three parameters, scaling
factors w and h (note that in practice w = h), and a rectangular region of interest I . Upon request,
each datacenter scales a shadow image using modified bilinear interpolation and crops the shadow
image by selecting the color values of only the pixels that are part of the requested region I (as
shown in Figure 4.2b). As cropping is equivalent to the existing cropping technique, we will not
discuss it further. For scaling, we will only discuss the scaling of the pth shadow image that is
performed by the pth datacenter as the scaling of one shadow image is equivalent to the scaling of
another.
To scale its shadow image, the pth datacenter first computes D(d)j , the integer representative
of the jth interpolating factor Dj , from the scaling factors h and w, and the round-off parameter
d. Then, depending on the value of h and w, the datacenter iteratively selects the color values
{Ci,p, Ci+1,p, Ci+2,p, Ci+3,p} of four pixels and interpolates them. Therefore, by Equation 4.2, the
















j (by Equation 4.5)







































































Ri+j(Dj + Dj ,d) +
3∑
j=0











r(Dj + Dj ,d)
)× 10d) mod q (4.6)
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r(Dj + Dj ,d)
)× 10d) mod q
≡ ((R′s +G′sp+B′sp2 + k−1∑
r=3
Krp
r)× 10d) mod q (by Equation 4.2), (4.8)
where R′s = (Rs + Rs), G′s = (Gs + Gs), and B′s = (Bs + Bs) are the interpolated red, green,
and blue color values; Rs,Gs, andBs are the red, green, and blue values of s when the interpolation
is performed by conventional bilinear interpolation; Rs , Gs , and Bs are the scaling errors of Rs,
Gs, and Bs; and Kr =
∑3
j=0,(Dj ,d + j)ai+j,r
)
is a constant for all the shares.
The resulting scaled and cropped shadow image is then sent to the user.
4.2.3 Secret image recovery
As shown in Figure 4.2c and Figure 4.2d, in this step, the user recovers the scaled/cropped secret
image from any k scaled/cropped shadow images by reconstructing the color of a pixel of the secret
image from the colors of the pixels of the shadow images. The reconstruction depends on the type
of operation (i,e., scaling or cropping) performed on a shadow image. The color of a pixel of a
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scaled image is recovered from the colors of the scaled shadow images given by Equation 4.6 (i.e.,
C ′s,p’s), and the color of a pixel of a cropped image is recovered from the cropped shadow images
given in Equation 4.5 (i.e., Ci,p’s).
To reconstruct the color of the sth pixel in the scaled secret image, Lagrange interpolation is first







































)× 10d)ti(x) mod q,














)× 10d) mod q.
Thus, we can obtain R′s, G′s, and B′s by first dividing L(x) by 10d, and then solving the polynomial
L(x)
10d






























As the magnitude of each of the scaling errors Rs , Gs , and Bs is bound by ±51 × 101−d (by
Equation 4.3), for a sufficiently large d, obtained red R′s, green G′s, and blue B′s colors are close to
Rs, Gs, and Bs, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Data Sets
Name Dimension Size
Histo 2756× 3663 28.9 MB
Drom 3000× 4000 34.4 MB
Lena 512× 512 768 KB
Singa 2110× 1000 6.1 MB
Alternatively, the color value of the sth pixel in the cropped secret image is obtained by first
























j) mod q (by the Unisolvence Theorem)
from the color values of the sth pixel of k cropped shadow images; and then solving L(x) to obtain
Rs, Gs, and Bs. Unlike image scaling, no division by 10d is required as the color value of a pixel
of a shadow image was not multiplied by 10d during image cropping.
4.3 Results and Analyses
We first implemented the proposed secret image sharing scheme and modified bilinear scaling using
C as the programming language and on the Ubuntu platform. We used k = 4 and n = 5 for our
ramp secret sharing, and d = 2 in modified-bilinear interpolation. We tested this experimental
setup with four color (i.e., RGB) images: a histopathological image called Histo, a military band
image called Band, the popular Lena image, and a Singapore city image called Singa. The details
of these images are provided in Table 4.1. Furthermore, we implemented our cloud-based image
scaling/cropping framework by simulating the server, datacenters, and the client in a PC powered by
an Intel Core 2 Quad 2.83 Ghz processor and 4 GB of RAM. The simulation uses PHP to implement
CHAPTER 4. SECURE CLOUD-BASED IMAGE SCALING/CROPPING 47
(a) Secret Histo (b) Secret Lena (c) Secret Band (d) Secret Singa
(e) First Share of Histo (f) First Share of Lena (g) First Share of Band (h) Fifth Share of Singa
(i) Second Share of Histo (j) Second Share of Lena (k) Second Share of Band (l) Second Share of Singa
(m) Third Share of Histo (n) Third Share of Lena (o) Fourth Share of Band (p) Third Share of Singa
(q) Fourth Share of Histo (r) Fifth Share of Lena (s) Fifth Share of Band (t) Fourth Share of Singa
(u) Recovered Histo (v) Recovered Lena (w) Recovered Band (x) Recovered Singa
Figure 4.3: Application of (3, 4, 5) randomized ramp secret sharing on images.
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the datacenters, the Apache Web Server to host the datacenters, and Windows WPF to implement
the client. The client-datacenter communication is facilitated by the HTTP protocol. We tested this
simulation with the military band image.
Figure 4.3 shows the results of our secret image sharing scheme. As can be verified from this
figure, the shadow images are noise-like images. Therefore, they do not perceptually disclose any
information of the secret image to datacenters. Figure 4.4 demonstrates scaling on shadow images,
and Figure 4.6 demonstrates cropping on shadow images. As can be verified from the figures,
any scaled/cropped shadow images are noise-like, but with the knowledge of at least four of them,
the secret scaled/cropped image can be recovered. Figure 4.6 shows the zooming and panning
operations in our secure image scaling/cropping framework.
4.3.1 Security analysis
To support the claim that the proposed framework ensures data confidentiality and data integrity,
we analyze it in this section.
Confidentiality
In addition to being perceptually secure, which can be verified from Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and
Figure 4.5, our scheme is perfectly secure in a group of at most (k − 3) datacenters as we use 3
secrets and k−3 random numbers in ramp secret sharing [59]. Therefore, an adversary, irrespective
of his/her computational power, cannot obtain any information about the secret image by accessing
at most (k − 3) datacenters. Furthermore, even if the adversary is able to access (k − 2) or (k − 1)
datacenters, he/she can only get 13 or
2
3 of the secret information as our secret sharing is a (3, k, n)
ramp secret sharing scheme [58, 59]. Although leakage of this information can decrease the number
of possible values that a color component can take from 256 to 2563 or
2×256
3 respectively, it cannot
change the search space of the color component from 0 − 255 [58]. Therefore, the randomness in
finding the secret image is less affected, and, as shown in the figures, the recovered image from
k − 1 or k − 2 shadow images is a noise-like image.
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(a) Required Scaled Image (b) Scaled Shadow Image (c) Recovered Scaled Image
(d) Required Scaled Image (e) Scaled Shadow Image (f) Recovered Scaled Image
(g) Required Scaled Image (h) Scaled Shadow Image (i) Recovered Scaled Image
(j) Required Scaled Image (k) Scaled Shadow Image (l) Recovered Scaled Image
Figure 4.4: Secure cloud-based scaling of Histo, Lena, Band, and Singa images.
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(a) Required Cropped Image (b) Cropped Shadow Image (c) Recovered Cropped Image
(d) Required Cropped Image (e) Cropped Shadow Image (f) Recovered Cropped Image
(g) Required Cropped Image (h) Cropped Shadow Image (i) Recovered Cropped Image
(j) Required Cropped Image (k) Cropped Shadow Image (l) Recovered Cropped Image
Figure 4.5: Secure cloud-based cropping of Histo, Lena, Band, and Singa images.




Figure 4.6: Zooming and panning operations in secure image scaling/cropping framework
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.7: ((a), (b))- two recovered images when a shadow image of Histo is tampered; ((c), (d)) -
two recovered images when two shadow images of Histo are tampered.
Integrity
By inheriting the property of secret sharing that uses the condition k < n, the proposed scheme also
ensures data integrity by detecting any tampering with the shadow images and stopping a user from





number of ways to recover the secret
image from n shadow images. Therefore, a user can recover the same secret image using two or
many ways yielding two or more recovered images. If one or more shadow images used in finding
the recovered images are tampered with, then the recovered images will be dissimilar to each other
and to the secret image (as shown in Figure 4.7). Therefore, by comparing the recovered images,
the user can detect tampering with the shadow images and discard all the recovered images. Note





+ 1 recovered images to detect tempering.
Availability
By inheriting the property of secret sharing, our framework also ensures data availability as the
client is able to reconstruct the secret image even if at most n− k number of datacenters are unable
to participate.
4.3.2 Performance analysis
In this section, we analyze our framework’s data overhead in transmitting the shadow images to the
user and computational overhead in recovering the secret image. These costs affect the latency of
accessing and interacting with the stored images. We are less concerned with the computational
cost of preparing the shadow images since it can be done offline.
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In our scheme, a user requires the scaled/cropped shadow images of at least k datacenters to
recover the scaled/cropped secret image. Therefore, if b bits are needed to represent a color value of
a pixel of the shadow image, a total of bk bits are required to reconstruct the color value of a pixel
of the secret image. As a result, the data overhead of our scheme is bk−2424 times more than that of
the conventional image streaming. The value of b, however, is equal to the number of bits required
to represent the prime number q that is greater than (255 + 51× 101−d)× 10d as b ∈ GF(q). As a
result, for a typical case of d = 2 and k = 4, the data overhead of our scheme can be calculated to
be one and half times more than that of the conventional streaming – such significant data overhead
is the main weakness.
The computational overhead in recovering a secret image is dependent on the computation cost
w of the Lagrange interpolation that reconstructs a secret color value of a pixel, and the dimensions
of the secret image. Our C implementation on a PC with an Intel Core 2 Quad 2.83 Ghz processor
and 4GB of RAM recovers the secret image from the first, second, third, and fourth shadow yields
w = 0.3 µs: due to which, approximately 78.65 ms are required to recover a secret image of
512× 512 dimension.
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we first proposed a new (3, k, n) secret image sharing scheme that both preserves
the homomorphic property of Shamir’s secret sharing and the pixel positions of the secret image
in a shadow image, to allow scaling and cropping operations on the shadow image. We then used
this secret image sharing scheme to design a secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework
that stores a shadow image in a datacenter, allows the datacenter to perform image scaling/cropping
operations on its shadow image, and allows a user to recover the secret scaled/cropped image from k
scaled/cropped shadow images. We showed that our scheme can also detect tampering of a shadow





In this chapter, we discuss our secure cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-casting framework
that uses Shamir’s secret sharing to hide the color information of 3D volumetric data from the
datacenters.
The core idea of the proposed scheme is to use Shamir’s secret sharing to hide the color informa-
tion of volume data from cloud datacenters. Upon a user’s request, the datacenters can then render
color-hidden images, which can be used by the user to recover the secret rendered image. However,
the incompatibility of the floating point operations of volume ray-casting with secret sharing is an
issue.
Since we pre-compute pre ray-projection rendering components, such as gradient/normal esti-
mation, classification, and shading, we are not concerned about their floating point operations. We
are also less concerned about floating point operations associated with opacity interpolation and
composition as we do not hide opacities. We are only concerned about the floating point operations
of color interpolation and composition.
As discussed in Chapter 3, we can address the incompatibility of color interpolation and composi-
tion with floating point numbers by two approaches: either (i) exclude the modular prime operation
from Shamir’s secret sharing, or (ii) convert the floating point operation of color interpolation and
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composition to fixed point operations. We use both these approaches. Using the former approach,
we propose SR-MPVR (Secure Rendering by Modification of Shamir’s Secret Sharing), and using
the latter approach, we design SR-MSSS (Secure Rendering by Modification of Pre-classification
Volume Ray-casting). As both these techniques incur high data overhead, we propose a third tech-
nique called SR-RSS (Secure Rendering by Ramp Secret Sharing), which improves upon SR-MSSS
by first replacing modified Shamir’s secret sharing with a modified (3, 4, 5) ramp secret sharing, and
then restricting the value of a share (which is a floating point number) to a smaller number and rep-
resenting the restricted value with an integer.
In the following sections, we first modify pre-classification volume ray-casting to perform only
fixed point operations, and then explain our secure cloud-based volume rendering framework using
SR-MPVR, SR-MSSS, and SR-RSS in detail.
5.1 Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting with Fixed Point Operations
To make Shamir’s secret sharing compatible with pre-classification volume ray casting, we perform
the arithmetic operations involved over a finite field, in the integer domain, instead of floating point.
In this section, we outline the steps that required this change and analyze the numerical precision
required to bound the error in the resulting rendered color to within one.
5.1.1 Modifying interpolation
The interpolation of the colors, which is given in Equation 2.2, adds N(s) multiplied values, where
each multiplication is between an integer Cv and a float Dv. Therefore, to convert the interpolation
to a fixed point operation, we replace Dv with a fixed point number D
(d)
v obtained by first rounding
off Dv by d decimal places and then multiplying 10d by the rounded off value. Mathematically,
D
(d)
v is written as
D(d)v =
(
Dv + Dv ,d
)× 10d, (5.1)
where Dv ,d is the round-off error.
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By replacing Dv with D
(d)












Dv + Dv ,d






























v∈N(s)CvDv ,d is the error resulting from the interpolation step. This error satisfies
the following result.
Lemma 1. If Cs =
∑
v∈N(s)CvDv ,d denotes the error in the interpolation of colors, then Cs is
bounded by the lower bound
Cs,min = −1020× 10−d
and the upper bound
Cs,max =

89.25, if d = 1
1020× 10−d, if d > 1
.
Proof. It is given that Cs =
∑
v∈N(s)CvDv ,d, where Cv is the color of a data voxel v, Dv ,d is
the error in rounding off Dv by d decimal paces, and N(s) is the number of neighbouring data
voxels of the sample point s. By Inequality 2.4, Cv satisfies 0 ≤ Cv ≤ 255; and by Proposition 1
and Proposition 2, Dv ,d satisfies −0.5 × 10−d ≤ Dv ,d ≤ 0.5 × 10−d. Therefore in an ideal
case, the lower bound Cs,min and the upper bound Cs,max of Cs can be obtained by setting(




Cv = 255, Dv ,d = 0.5 × 10−d
)
respectively. However,
as discussed below, for d = 1, we cannot choose Dv ,d = 0.5× 10−d for all eight neighboring data
voxels N(s) of s.
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By Proposition 2, the error Dv ,d = 0.5 × 10−d is obtained when the dth digit of Dv is an odd
number, the (d + 1)th digit is five, and for all t > 1, the (d + t)th digit is zero. For d = 1, the
lowest possible value ofDv that can satisfy this condition is 0.15. By Equation 2.5, the sum of eight
Dv’s corresponding to each v ∈ N(s), however, must be equal to one. Thus, even if we choose
Dv = 0.15, we can get a maximum of six Dv’s that can result in Dv ,d = 0.5× 10−d. The rounding
errors of the remaining two Dv’s, whose sum must be 1− 0.15× 6 = 0.10, are −δ and +δ, where
0.001 ≤ δ ≤ 0.049.
However, for d > 1, we can get eight Dv’s resulting in Dv ,d = 0.5 × 10−d, as each of them
can satisfy Proposition 2. For d ≥ 2, one set of such Dv’s can contain seven r1’s, where r1 =
0.00 . . . 0(d− 1 times)15, and one r2, where r2 = 0.99 . . . 9(d− 2 times)895.
Alternatively, for d ≥ 1, we can also get eight Dv’s resulting in Dv ,d = −0.5 × 10−d, as each
of them can satisfy Proposition 1. For d ≥ 1, one set of such Dv’s can contain seven r1, where
r1 = 0.00 . . . 0(d times)5, and one r2, where r2 = 0.99 . . . 9(d− 1 times)65.







To obtain Cs,max, we, however, consider two cases: d = 1 and d > 1. For d = 1, we choose
Cv = 255 for all six data voxels that result in round-off error Dv ,d = 0.5 × 10−d, and for the
data voxels that result in round-off error Dv ,d = +δ. To neutralize the negative round-off error
Dv ,d = −δ of the remaining data voxel, we choose its color as Cv = 0. Furthermore, to maximize
Cs,max, we choose the value of δ as 0.049, which can be assumed to be 0.05 with a negligible error.




255× (5× 10−(1+1)))+ (255× 0.5)+ (0× 0.5)
= 89.25.
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As a result, we can write Cs,max as
Cs,max =

89.25, if d = 1
1020× 10−d, if d > 1.
5.1.2 Modifying composition
The composition of color, as given in Equation 2.9, adds c multiplied values, where each mul-
tiplication is between two floating point numbers, Csi and Oi. Thus, to convert composition to
integer-only operation, we replace Csi with C
′







)× 10f , (5.4)
where Oi,f is the rounding error due to rounding off Oi to f decimal places.
By putting C ′s in the place of Cs and O
(f)
i in the place of Oi in Equation 2.9, we obtain scaled























)× 10d+f (by Equation 5.4)






















CsiOi + CsiOi,f + Csi Oi,f
))× 10d+f (by Equation 2.9)







is the round-off error resulted in the composition
step. This error’s lower bound and upper bound are calculated by Theorem 2.
Remark 1. The color C ′ is scaled up by 10d+f in the rendering stage. Therefore, it must be scaled
down by 10d+f after rendering.




CsiOi + CsiOi,f + Csi Oi,f
)
is the total round-off error resulting
from the composition step, then C is bounded by the lower bound
C,min =

C,min,1, if c ≥ 10.5×10−f
max(C,min,2,−255), if c < 10.5×10−f and c is divisible by 4
max(C,min,3,−255), if c < 10.5×10−f and c is divisible by 2 but not divisible by 4






510c× 10−(f+d))− (127.5c× 10−f)− (1020× 10−d),
C,min,3 =
(
510(c− 2)× 10−(f+d))− (127.5(c− 2)× 10−f)− (1020× 10−d),
C,min,4 =
(
510(c− 1)× 10−(f+d))− (127.5(c− 1)× 10−f)− (1020× 10−d);
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0.5×10−f , c)× 10−f ) + 89.25Oci
+ (446.2×min( Oci
0.5×10−f , c)× 10−(f+d)), if d = 1
(127.5×min( Oci
0.5×10−f , c)× 10−f ) + (1020Oci × 10−d)
+ (510×min( Oci
0.5×10−f , c)× 10−(f+d)), if d > 1,
where Oci satisfies the condition 255O
c
i + C,max = 255.




CsiOi + CsiOi,f + Csi Oi,f
)
, where Csi is the interpolated
color of a sample point, Csi is the round-off error in color interpolation, and Oi,f is the error
in rounding off Oi. Of the four variables used in the formulation, Csi and Csi are free from the
number of sample points c, but Oi and Oi,f are dependent on the value of c since Oi must satisfy∑c
i=1Oi ≤ 1. Furthermore, we know that Csi and Csi satisfy the conditions 0 ≤ Csi ≤ 255 (by
Inequality 2.6) and Csi ,min ≤ Csi ≤ Csi ,max (by Lemma 1) respectively. Thus, the lower bound
of C , denoted by C,min, can be found when Csi = 255 and Csi = Csi ,min; and the upper bound
of C , denoted by C,max, can be found when Csi = 255 and Csi = Csi ,max. As a result, the











































As Oci > 0 and Oi,f < 0, to obtain the value of C,min, we have to maximize the value of O
c
i
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and minimize the value of
∑c
i=1 Oi,f . By Inequality 2.12, we know that O
c
i ≤ 1; therefore, we
can choose Oci = 1. In an ideal case, the minimum value of
∑c
i=1 Oi,f is obtained when each
Oi,f = −0.5 × 10−f . As discussed below, we cannot, however, choose Oi,f = −0.5 × 10−f for
all Oi’s, as they must be selected such that the condition Oci = 1 is satisfied.
Let us first find the value of each Oi,f when the number of sample points c satisfies c ≥ 10.5×10−f .
For c > 1
0.5×10−f , we can get c number of Oi’s such that each Oi is less than
1
0.5×10−f . When
rounded off by f decimal places, each of these Oi will result in a round-off error Oi,f = −Oi. As
a result,
∑c
i=1 Oi,f = −1. Similarly, for c = 10.5×10−f , we can get c number of Oi’s such that
the f th digit of each Oi is 0, the (f + 1)th digit is five, and for all t > 1, the (f + t)th digit is 0.
Therefore, by Proposition 1, each Oi will result in a round-off error Oi,f = −0.5×10−f : resulting∑c
i=1 Oi,f = −1.
Now let us find the value of each Oi when c < 10.5×10−f . In this case, we can choose c − 1
number of Oi’s such that the f th digit of each Oi is an even number, the (f + 1)th digit is five, and
for all t > 1, the (f + t)th digit is 0. Therefore, by Proposition 1, each Oi among c − 1 Oi’s can
result in a round-off error Oi,f = −0.5× 10−f . The round-off error of the remaining Oi, however,
depends on the divisibility of c with four. Firstly, if c is divisible by four, then the f th digit of the
remaining Oi is an even number, (f + 1)th digit is five, and for all t > 1, (f + t)th digit is zero.
Therefore, by Proposition 1, Oi,f of the remaining Oi is Oi,f = −0.5 × 10−f . Secondly, if c is
divisible by two but not divisible by four, then the f th digit of the remaining Oi is an odd number,
the (f + 1)th digit is five, and for all t > 1, the (f + t)th digit is zero. Therefore, by Proposition 2,
Oi,f of the remaining Oi is Oi,f = 0.5× 10−f . Finally, if c is an odd number, then the (f + 1)th
digit of each Oi is 0 and for all t ≥ 1, the (f + t)th digit is 0; resulting Oi,f = 0.
Now, putting these values of Oi,f andOi in the equation of C,min, we can derive C,min for four
different values of c as follows.
For c ≥ 1
0.5×10−f , we can set O
c
i = 1 and
∑c
i=1 Oi,f = −1 in Equation 5.6, and obtain C,min
as
C,min,1 = Cs,min − 255− Cs,min
= −255.
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For c < 1
0.5×10−f and c divisible by four, we can set O
c
i = 1, Cs,min = −1020 × 10d, and
Oi,f = −0.5× 10−f in Equation 5.6; and obtain C,min as
C,min,2 =




(− 1020× 10−d c∑
i=1
−0.5× 10−f)
= 510c× 10−(f+d) − 127.5c× 10−f − 1020× 10−d.
For c < 1
0.5×10−f and c divisible by two but not divisible by four, we can set O
c
i = 1, Cs,min =
−1020 × 10−d, Oi,f = −0.5 × 10−f for c − 1 sample points, and Oi,f = 0.5 × 10−f for the
remaining sample point in Equation 5.6, and obtain C,min as
C,min,3 =




(− 1020× 10−d c−2∑
i=1
−0.5× 10−f)
= 510(c− 2)× 10−(f+d) − 127.5(c− 2)× 10−f − 1020× 10−d.
Finally, for c < 1
0.5×10−f and c being an odd number, we can set O
c
i = 1, Cs,min = −1020 ×
10−d, and Oi,f = −0.5× 10−f for c− 1 sample points in Equation 5.6, and obtain C,min as
C,min,4 =




(− 1020× 10−d c−1∑
i=1
−0.5× 10−f)
= 510(c− 1)× 10−(f+d) − 127.5(c− 1)× 10−f − 1020× 10−d.
The obtained value of C,min cannot be less than −255 as both the condition 0 ≤ C ≤ 255 and
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the condition 0 ≤ C + C,min ≤ 255 must be satisfied. Therefore, we can write C,min as
C,min =

C,min,1, if c ≥ 10.5×10−f
max(C,min,2,−255), if c < 10.5×10−f and c is divisible by 4
max(C,min,3,−255), if c < 10.5×10−f and c is divisible by 2 but not divisible by 4
max(C,min,4,−255), if c < 10.5×10−f and c is not divisible by 2
.
Now let us derive the upper bound C,max.
We know that Oci > 0 and that Oi,f can be a positive number, therefore the upper bound C,max,
which is written in Equation 5.7, is a positive number. As a result, the obtained color C + C,max
can be greater than the actual color C. By Inequality 2.14, both C + C,max and C, however, must
satisfy the conditions C+ C,max ≤ 255 (as 0 ≤ C+  ≤ 255) and 0 ≤ C ≤ 255, respectively. The
condition C < 255 is satisfied when Csi < 255 for at least one sample point orOi’s satisfyO
c
i < 1.
Obtaining C,max by considering the former case is tedious as it will affect the error analysis in the
interpolation step. Therefore, we will consider the latter required condition: Oci < 1 that satisfies
H = 255Oci + C,max = 255. In other words, to find C,max, we have to choose Oi’s such that H
is satisfied and
∑c
i=1 Oi,f is maximized.
The maximum value of
∑c
i=1 Oi,f is obtained when the Oi’s are chosen in such a way that most
Oi’s have round-off error Oi,f = 0.5 × 10−f . Ideally, Oi,f = 0.5 × 10−f is obtained when
Proposition 2 is satisfied. Finding a fixed number of Oi’s that can satisfy Proposition 2, however, is
difficult as we do not know the upper bound ofOci in advance. Therefore, we consider the alternative
case of Oi = 5× 10−f+1 + δ that can result in round-off error Oi,f = 0.5× 10−f with δ ≈ 0. In
this case, the number of Oi’s having a round-off error Oi,f = 0.5 × 10−f , however, is dependent
on the number of sample points c and the value of Oci as discussed below.
For c ≥ Oci




0.5×10−f , as each Oi must be equal to 0.5 × 10−f + δ. For c < Oci , c number of
Oi’s, however, can result Oi,f = 0.5× 10−f .
Therefore, by setting Cs = 255, and the error Oi,f = 0.5× 10−f for min( O
c
i
0.5×10−f , c) times in
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0.5×10−f , c)× 10−f ) + 89.25Oci
+ (446.2×min( Oci
0.5×10−f , c)× 10−(f+d)), if d = 1
(127.5×min( Oci
0.5×10−f , c)× 10−f ) + (1020Oci × 10−d)
+ (510×min( Oci
0.5×10−f , c)× 10−(f+d)), if d > 1,
where Oci satisfies the equation 255O
c
i + C,max = 255.
Due to the error in composition, C ′ satisfies
C ′ ≤ (C + C,max)× 10d+f
≤ (255 + C,max)× 10d+f (by Inequality 2.14). (5.8)
We know that the color of a pixel is a natural number obtained by truncating the fractional part
of the composited color. Therefore, a round-off error C , which cannot change the integral part of
C, does not change the rendered color, and hence the error is not effective. Thus, we claim the
following.
Claim 3. If C is the round-off error in the composition of colors, then the effective round-off error
C,eff is obtained by
C,eff = bC + c − bCc,
where C is the composited color by conventional pre-classification volume ray-casting.
Corollary 2. If c, the number of sample points along a ray, satisfies c ≤ 7× 10t, where t ∈ N and
t > 1, then for d ≥ 4 and f ≥ t+ 3, the effective rounding error C,eff is bounded by ±1.
Proof. By Claim 3, the rounding error C,eff is bounded by ±1 when C,min and C,max satisfy
conditions −1 < C,min < 0 and 0 < C,max < 1 respectively. Therefore, we will analyze the
conditions to find the value of d and f that satisfies C,min > −1 and C,max < 1.
We can write C,max as C,max = a1 + a2 + a3, where a1 = 127.5c× 10−f , a2 = 1020× 10−d,
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and a3 = 510c × 10−(f+d). Thus, to obtain C,max < 1, each of a1, a2, and a3 must be less than
one.
By choosing d ≥ 4, we get a2 ≤ 0.102, and for this value of d, a1 ≤ 0.8925 when c ≤ 7 × 10t
and f ≥ t+ 3. For these values of d and f , we get a3 ≤ 0.000357. Thus, for d ≥ 4 and f ≥ t+ 3,
C,max can satisfy C,max < 1.
Similarly, we can write the equation of C,min as C,min = −a1− a2 + a3. For the above chosen
value of a1, a2, and a3, C,min > −1.
Hence, we conclude that for c ≤ 7× 10t, d ≥ 4, and f ≥ t+ 3, C,eff is bounded by ±1
5.2 Cloud-Based Secure Rendering
Using the above modified ray-casting operations, we can now describe how secret sharing is done.
We first present our secure cloud-based rendering framework using standard Shamir’s secret sharing
and the modified ray-casting operations (SR-MPVR). Then, we describe SR-MSSS, which uses a
weakened version of Shamir’s secret sharing and standard ray-casting operations. Finally, a more
efficient version that uses ramp secret sharing (SR-RSS) is presented.
5.2.1 Architecture
The architecture of our framework consists of three components: the server (e.g., a hospital) that
hosts the secret data, n cloud datacenters, and the client (e.g., doctor) who intends to access the
secret image (Figure 5.1). We assume that: (i) the server and the client are trusted entities, (ii)
the datacenters do not share or exchange the confidential data/image with each other, and (iii) the
datacenters and the client are connected to each other via a two-way high speed network.
5.2.2 SR-MPVR
As shown in Figure 5.2, the workflow of the proposed framework can be divided into four steps: (i)
data preparation, (ii) ray-projection, (iii) post ray-projection rendering, and (iv) image recovery.























Figure 5.1: Architecture of secure cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-casting.
Data Preparation
The data preparation step creates n shares of the secret volume V . As we only hide the color
information, the hidden volumes, V1, V2, ... maintain the shape and order of the voxels of V ; only
the color information is modified. To achieve this, the server first finds the color and the opacity
of each data voxel v of a given volume V by performing gradient estimation, classification, and
shading operations; and then creates n shares of V by secret sharing the color Cv of v to n shares
and copying the opacity Av of v n times.
To create shares of Cv, we first choose a prime number q that is greater than the value of the
maximum reconstructed secret (255+C,max)×10d+f (which is derived in Equation 5.8), and then










Note that we use one q to share all the Cv’s as they must belong to one GF(q) in order to be added
together in the future. In finding the value of q, we also fix the value of d and f in this step.
By setting x = p in F (x), we find the pth share of Cv as
Cv,p = F (p)



























Figure 5.2: Workflow of secure cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-casting.

















Next, we create the pth share volume of V , Vp, and send Vp to the pth datacenter.
Ray-projection
In this step, rays from the image space are projected on each share volume data. We define that the
set of rays that is projected on a share volume data is equal to the set of rays that could have been
projected on the secret volume data. Therefore, the set of rays that is projected on a share volume
data is also equal to the set of rays that is projected on another share volume data.
Post Ray-projection Rendering
In this step, post ray-projection operations such as sampling, interpolation, and composition are
performed on each share volume. The post ray-projection of one share volume is similar to others,
and within a share volume, the rendering along all the projected rays is similar. We will therefore
focus our further discussion on rendering along one ray in the pth share volume data Vp.
Sampling: In this step, a ray projected on Vp is sampled at c sample points s1,p, s2,p, . . . , sc,p
such that xyz-coordinate si,p and xyz-coordinate si (a sample point on the ray when it is projected
on V ) are the same.
Interpolation: This step finds the opacity and color of a sample point sp ∈ Vp by interpolating
the opacities and the colors of all eight neighboring voxels of s, and the operations of this step is
the same as the operation on the secret volume V .
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Since we did not change the opacity, the interpolated opacity is found by the conventional opacity
interpolation technique. The voxel’s color, on the other hand, has changed. Therefore, color inter-
polation is performed by the modified-interpolation technique. The required interpolating factor is
equivalent to Dv, the interpolating factor in a case of interpolation over V , as the xyz-coordinate
of each sample point s and voxel v of Vp is equivalent to the xyz-coordinate of the sample point sp
and voxel vp in V , respectively.
By putting the opacity of vp ∈ N(sp) as Av and the interpolating factor of vp as Dv in Equa-
tion 2.3, we can get the interpolated opacity of sp ∈ Vp equal to As, which is the interpolated
opacity of s ∈ V .
Similarly, by putting the color of vp as Cv,p and the interpolating factor of vp as Dv in Equa-













































mod q (by Equation 5.2)










Dv + Dv ,d
)× 10d (by Equation 5.1),
is the same for all share volumes, as the interpolating factor of the qth data voxel vq of each share
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volume is Dv, and each Dv is rounded off by d decimal places.
Composition: This step composites the opacities and the colors of all the sample points s1,p, s2,p,
. . . , sc,p along the projected ray. As we do not share the opacities, they can be composited by the
conventional composition formula given in Equation 2.10. The composition of colors, however,
must be performed by the modified-composition technique that is formulated in Equation 5.5.
As the interpolated opacity of sample point si,p is Asi , by Equation 2.10 and Equation 2.11, the
composited opacity of the sample points s1,p, s2,p, . . . , sc,p is A.
The composition of color, however, uses C ′p as the color of si,p. Using C ′p in Equation 5.5, we
















































mod q (by Equation 5.5)





i is the same for all the shares.
Image Recovery
Finally, an authorized user recovers the secret image from k share images obtained from k data-
centers. We will show that the recovered image is close to the image rendered by conventional
pre-classification volume ray-casting. As the colors and opacities of different pixels of the recov-
ered image are found by same method, we will focus our discussion on one pixel.
As we do not hide opacities, the opacity of a pixel of a share image becomes the opacity of the
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corresponding pixel of the secret image. The color of a pixel of the secret image is recovered from
k shared colors (as given in Equation 5.14) by using Lagrange interpolation.
Given any k scaled composited colors: {C ′x0 , C ′x1 , . . . , C ′xk} of k datacenters {x0, x1, . . . , xk}


















mod q (by Equation 5.10)
= H(xi).















is a (k − 1)-degree polynomial. Then, by the Unisolvence theorem L(x) is equivalent to H(x).
Therefore, we can obtainC ′ by setting x = 0 in L(x). SinceC ′ is scaled up by 10d+f , by Remark 1,





(C + C)× 10d+f
10d+f
(by Equation 5.6)
= C + C .
In Corollary 2, we showed that C can be bounded by ±1 for a sufficiently large value of d and f .
Thus, we can conclude that the color rendered by our scheme (i.e, C ′′) is close to the color rendered
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by conventional ray-casting (i.e., C).
5.2.3 SR-MSSS
We now describe the SR-MSSS method, an alternative to SR-MPVR. SR-MSSS uses floating point
operations, but uses a variation of Shamir’s secret sharing with a weaker security guarantee. The
main workflow of SR-MSSS is similar to SR-MPVR, so we only highlight the differences below.
Data preparation
To share the colors, SR-MSSS uses the modified Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Therefore, to
share the color Cv of a data voxel v ∈ V , we define a polynomial





Using this polynomial, we find the pth share of Cv as
Cv,p = F
′(p)
= Cv + αp. (5.15)
Using Cv,p as the color of the data voxel v, the pth share volume is created.
Post ray-projection rendering
As we do not use any modular prime operation to share the colors of the voxels, unlike SR-MPVR,
we can use the conventional color rendering algorithm to render the colors.











Dv (by Equation 5.15)








= Cs + αpDs, (by Equation 2.2) (5.16)
where Ds =
∑
v∈N(sp)Dv is a constant for all share volumes.
Next, using Cs,p as the interpolated color of a sample point s in Equation 2.9, we obtain the



















= C + αp
c∑
i=1
DsiOi (by Equation 2.9)
= C +Kαp, (5.17)
where K =
∑c
i=1DsiOi is the same for all the shares.
Image recovery
To recover the secret color from color shares (derived in Equation 5.17) obtained from k datacen-
ters, we use Lagrange interpolation without the modular prime operation. The modified Lagrange












j)ti(x). (by Equation 5.10)
By the Unisolvence theorem, L′(x) = C + K
∑k−1
j=1 ajx
j . Thus, by setting x = 0 in L′(x), we
can obtain the color C, which is equivalent to the color rendered by conventional ray-casting. Note
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that no division operation is performed on C since the color values were not scaled in the rendering
stage.
5.2.4 SR-RSS
We now present another alternative, SR-RSS, that uses ramp secret sharing to reduce the size of the
share images.
Data preparation
The objective of this step is to optimize modified Shamir’s secret sharing to create smaller share
volumes.
We know that the three color components of a pixel, i.e., the red color R, the green color G, and
the blue color B, are rendered by identical rendering operations, and that by rendering a share, a
datacenter renders all the coefficients used in the secret sharing polynomial. Therefore, we use the
color components Rv, Gv, and Bv of a voxel v as three secrets in the secret sharing polynomial.
Although (3, k, n) ramp secret sharing can reduce the data overhead by three times (as instead of
creating three shares, ramp secret sharing creates only one share for all three color components),
the resulting overhead is still a concern, as a shared color is represented by a floating point number,
requiring 4 bytes on a typical system.
However, if we limit the values of k and n, it is possible to limit the share color to 216, thus
requiring only two bytes.
To reduce the value of a color share, we choose a smaller share number at the time of secret
sharing by setting the condition k = 4 and n = 5 in our ramp secret sharing. Thus the secret
sharing polynomial becomes
F ′(x) = a0 +Rvx+Gvx2 +Bvx3, (5.18)
where a0 is a random number.
Using this polynomial and choosing a value of x smaller than five, we find the pth share of all
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the color components Rv, Gv, and Bv of data voxel v by
Cv,p = a0 +Rvp+Gvp
2 +Bvp
3. (5.19)
Using Cv,p as the color of the data voxel vp, we create the pth share volume Vp, and then send the
share volume to the corresponding datacenter. As the value of the color is less than 255 and the
value of x is less than or equal to five, for a0 ≤ 26011, the value of F ′(x) cannot exceed 65536.
Note that although we can choose n = k = 3 to restrict the value of a color share to 3315,
we do not recommend this optimization as such a scheme, by not using a random number in the
secret sharing polynomial, can result in a complete breakdown of our framework. First, this (3, 3, 3)
ramp secret sharing does not work for a gray image as it cannot hide black color (when all color
components are 0) and white color (when all color components are 255) of a voxel/pixel. Second,
due to spatial coherence in an image, it is easier for an adversary to guess the color of a voxel/pixel
from the known share value of the voxel/pixel and the share values of neighboring voxels/pixels
of the target voxel/pixel. Similarly, we also do not recommend n = k as this optimization cannot
guarantee data integrity and data availability (this will be discussed in Section 5.3.1).
Post Ray-projection Rendering
Similar to SR-MSSS, we use conventional color interpolation and color composition on the color
shares since no modular prime operation is required. Thus, by putting Cv,p as the color of v ∈ Vp





























3, (by Equation 2.2) (5.20)
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where Ds =
∑
v∈N(sp) a0Dv is a constant for all share volumes; and Rs, Gs, Bs are respectively
the red color, green color, and blue color interpolated by conventional ray-casting.
Next, by using Cs,p as the interpolated color of a sample point s in Equation 2.9, we obtain the





























= K +Rp+Gp2 +Bp3, (by Equation 2.9) (5.21)
where R, G, and B are the red color, green color, and blue color composited by the conventional
ray-casting, and K =
∑c
i=1DsiOi is constant for all the shares.
As the value of each F ′(p) is less than 65536, the value of Cp is also less than 65536. We convert
Cp to a fixed point number C
(g)
p by first rounding off Cp by g decimal places and then multiplying
10g by the rounded off value. Mathematically, C(g)p can be written as
C(g)p = (Cp + Cp,g)× 10g, (5.22)
where Cp,g is the round-off error satisfying −0.5× 10−g ≤ Cp,g ≤ 0.5× 10−g. We then send the
scaled color share C(g)p to the user.
Image Recovery
From any four share numbers (i.e., xi’s), and four color shares (i.e., C
(g)
xi ’s), this step finds the











(Cxi + Cxi ,g)× 10g
)








































is the rendering error due to rounding off Cp.
Theorem 3. If C =
∑3
i=0 Cxi ,gti(x) is the error in color composition by SR-RSS, where Cxi ,g is
the error in rounding off Cxi and ti(x) is the Lagrange basis function, then C satisfies







Proof. As given, the error C is a Lagrange interpolation of rounding errors Cxi ,g. In this interpola-
tion, each Cxi ,g satisfies −5× 10−(g+1) ≤ Cxi ,g ≤ 5× 10−(g+1), and the Lagrange basis function
ti(x)’s takes opposite signs for neighboring share numbers. Thus, to calculate the upper bound of
C , we consider Cxi ,g = 5× 10−(g+1) for all positive ti(x)’s, and Cxi ,g = −5× 10−(g+1) for all
negative ti(x)’s. Similarly, to calculate the lower bound of C , we consider Cxi ,g = −5×10−(g+1)
for all positive ti(x)’s, and Cxi ,g = 5× 10−(g+1) for all negative ti(x)’s.





xi − xj .
In our scheme, the share number xi satisfies 1 ≤ xi ≤ 5. Therefore, to maximize the value of
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ti(x)’s, we choose xi’s from the set {2, . . . , 5}. Next, we know that |C | will be maximized when it
is associated with only one coefficient. Thus, we set x = 0 in ti(x).
Now by substituting the above chosen values in the formula of C , we get








By the Unisolvence theorem, L′′(x) also can be written as
L′(x) = (K +Rx+Gx2 +Bx3 + C)× 10g.
Thus, we can recover the rendered colors by first dividing L′(x) by 10g, and then solving L
′(x)
10g to
obtain the second coefficient (for the red color), third coefficient (for the green color), and fourth
coefficient (for the blue color) of the simplified polynomial. Using this trick, direct formulas to




































By Theorem 3, the introduced error C satisfies











where R′ = R + C (the same as for G′ and B′). Thus, by choosing g ≥ 1, we can obtain
|C | < 1. As a result, we can conclude that the recovered color components are close to the color
components rendered by conventional rendering.
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Table 5.1: Data Sets
Name Dimension Bits per Voxel Size
Head 256×256×124 8 7.8 MB
Foot 256×256×256 8 16 MB
Bucky 32× 32× 32 8 32.2 KB
Ironprot 68× 68× 68 8 307.3 KB
These optimizations, however, degrades security as both the use of the ramp secret sharing
scheme, and the exclusion of the modular prime operation from secret sharing can disclose in-
formation about the secret. Furthermore, due to rounding error, there is a loss in information in the
rendered image.
Note that we choose to optimize SR-MSSS as all of the proposed optimization tricks can be
applied to SR-MSSS simultaneously. One can, however, extend the trick of using multiple secrets
in a secret sharing polynomial to SR-MPVR. The trick of limiting the value of a color share by
choosing a suitable share number, however, is not applicable to SR-MPVR as in the case of Shamir’s
secret sharing (which uses the modular prime operation), the size of a share is independent of the
share number.
5.3 Results and Analyses
We simulated the server, datacenters, and the client of our framework on a PC powered by an
Intel Core 2 Quad 2.83 GHz processor with 4GB of RAM. We implemented our framework by
first modifying the volume ray-casting module of the open source visualization package VTK to
facilitate pre-classification volume ray-casting, and then integrating secret sharing into the rendering
pipeline. In the case of SR-MPVR, we used (3, 5) Shamir’s secret sharing in conjunction with
modified pre-classification volume ray-casting; in the case of SR-MSSS, we used modified (3, 5)
Shamir’s secret sharing in conjunction with pre-classification volume ray-casting; and in the case
of SR-RSS we used (3, 4, 5) modified ramp secret sharing in conjunction with pre-classification
volume ray-casting. To validate our schemes, we used four sets of test volume data: Head, Foot,
Bucky, and Ironprot, whose details are given in Table 5.1. As the number of sampling points along
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(a) Secret Bucky (b) Secret Head (c) Secret Foot (d) Secret Ironprot
(e) First Share of Bucky (f) First Share of Head (g) First Share of Foot (h) Second Share of Ironprot
(i) Second Share of Bucky (j) Fourth Share of Head (k) Second Share of Foot (l) Fourth Share of Ironprot
(m) Fourth Share of Bucky (n) Fifth Share of Head (o) Third Share of Foot (p) Fifth Share of Ironprot
(q) Recovered Bucky (r) Recovered Head (s) Recovered Foot (t) Recovered Ironprot
Figure 5.3: Single view rendering by SR-MPVR
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(a) Secret Bucky (b) Secret Head (c) Secret Foot (d) Secret IronProt
(e) First Share of Bucky (f) Third Share of Head (g) Second Share of Foot (h) First Share of Ironprot
(i) Second Share of Bucky (j) Fourth Share of Head (k) Third Share of Foot (l) Third Share of Ironprot
(m) Third Share of Bucky (n) Fifth Share of Head (o) Fourth Share of Foot (p) Fourth Share of Ironprot
(q) Recovered Bucky (r) Recovered Head (s) Recovered Foot (t) Recovered Ironprot
Figure 5.4: Single view rendering by SR-MSSS
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(a) Secret Bucky (b) Secret Head (c) Secret Foot (d) Secret Ironprot
(e) First Share of Bucky (f) First Share of Head (g) First Share of Foot (h) Second Share of Ironprot
(i) Second Share of Bucky (j) Third Share of Head (k) Second Share of Foot (l) Third Share of Ironprot
(m) Third Share of Bucky (n) Fourth Share of Head (o) Third Share of Foot (p) Fourth Share of Ironprot
(q) Fourth Share of Bucky (r) Fifth Share of Head (s) Fourth Share of Foot (t) Fifth Share of Ironprot
(u) Recovered Bucky (v) Recovered Head (w) Recovered Foot (x) Recovered Ironprot
Figure 5.5: Single view rendering by SR-RSS
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(a) Secret (b) Third Share (c) Secret (d) Third Share
(e) Secret (f) Third Share (g) Secret (h) Third Share
(i) Secret (j) Third Share (k) Secret (l) Third Share
(m) Secret (n) Third Share (o) Secret (p) Third Share
(q) Secret (r) Third Share (s) Secret (t) Third Share
(u) Secret (v) Third Share (w) Secret (x) Third Share
Figure 5.6: Multiple view rendering by SR-MPVR
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(a) Secret (b) Third Share (c) Secret (d) Fourth Share
(e) Secret (f) Fifth Share (g) Secret (h) Fifth Share
(i) Secret (j) Second Share (k) Secret (l) Third Share
(m) Secret (n) Third Share (o) Secret (p) Third Share
(q) Secret (r) Third Share (s) Secret (t) Third Share
(u) Secret (v) Third Share (w) Secret (x) Third Share
Figure 5.7: Multiple view rendering by SR-MSSS
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(a) Secret (b) First Share (c) Secret (d) Second Share
(e) Secret (f) Third Share (g) Secret (h) Second Share
(i) Secret (j) Third Share (k) Secret (l) Fourth Share
(m) Secret (n) Third Share (o) Secret (p) Fifth Share
(q) Secret (r) First Share (s) Secret (t) Third Share
(u) Secret (v) Fourth Share (w) Secret (x) Fifth Share
Figure 5.8: Multiple view rendering by SR-RSS
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a ray that is projected on any of these test volumes does not exceed 700, for SR-MPVR, we fixed
d = 4 and f = 6 to obtain || ≤ 1. For SR-RSS, we rounded off the real numbers by one decimal
place (i.e., chosen g = 1) to keep the error below one.
Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4, and Figure 5.5 show the results of SR-MPVR, SR-MRSS, and SR-RSS,
respectively. As illustrated from these figures, the color information of the secret image is hidden in
share images, and the secret image can be recovered from these color-hidden images. Therefore, an
adversary having access to a share image cannot perceptually infer the color coded information of
the secret image. Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7, and Figure 5.8 show the results of SR-MPVR, SR-MSSS,
and SR-RSS from multiple viewpoints. As can be verified from these figures, our scheme has no
functional change with user’s interaction with the rendered image.
Note that since the color table look-up operations are performed by the server, the proposed
scheme will require server’s interference to provide user interactions requiring modification of color
look-up table.
5.3.1 Security analysis
In addition to perceptual security, our schemes also provide data confidentiality, data integrity, and
data availability.
Confidentiality
As SR-MPVR uses Shamir’s secret sharing, it is perfectly secure. Thus, an adversary, irrespective
of its computation power, cannot get any information about the secret color of a voxel/pixel by
accessing at most k − 1 datacenters.
By excluding the modular prime operation from secret sharing, SR-MSSS loses some informa-
tion about the secret color in a group of less than k datacenters. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, to
minimize the effect of loss of information, we can choose higher valued random numbers (i.e., ai’s)
as coefficients in the secret sharing polynomial to obtain higher share values for lower share num-
bers. For example, even for (2, n) modified secret sharing, if ai > 256 and x < 5, the probability
of knowing the secret is less than 1256 . In other words, we can provide more than 256 choices to an
adversary for guessing the secret, more than the number of color values possible.
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By using (3, 4, 5) modified ramp secret sharing, SR-RSS, in addition to losing information due
to the exclusion of the modular prime operation, also loses information due to the use of multiple
secrets in a secret sharing polynomial. Due to this information loss, an adversary, by accessing
more than one datacenter, can easily guess some of the secret color by converting (3, 4, 5) modified
ramp secret sharing to (3, 3, 5) modified ramp secret sharing. Therefore, SR-RSS is insecure when
an adversary can access more than one datacenter. To counter such scenarios, one can easily adjust
SR-RSS by introducing (3, k + 3, n) ramp secret sharing, where k is the maximum number of
datacenters that an adversary cannot access simultaneously.
Integrity
By inheriting the property of (k, n) secret sharing, SR-MPVR, SR-MSSS, and SR-RSS ensure the





different ways of reconstructing the
secret image. Therefore, if any adversary changes the color values of the share images (either by
directly tampering with the rendered image or by tampering the share volume) of at most n − 1
datacenters, then the reconstructed images from the tampered share images will differ from each






reconstructed images, the client can detect tampering.
However, if the adversary is able to tamper with the share images of all n datacenters by obeying
the homomorphic property of secret sharing, then all the tampered reconstructed images at the client
site will be alike. Thus, in this case, the client will not be able to detect the tampering. Similarly, if
n = k, then tampering with even one share image is not detectable as there can be a maximum of
one recovered image. Therefore, for applications requiring data integrity, we recommend using at
least one more datacenter than the number of datacenters required to recover the secret image.
Availability
By inheriting the property of (k, n) secret sharing, SR-MPVR, SR-MSSS, and SR-RSS also ensure
data availability as the client is able to reconstruct the secret image even if at most n− k number of
datacenters are unable to participate.
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(a) One Share Tampered – Non-
Homomorphic
(b) Two Shares Tampered –
Non-Homomorphic
(c) Three Shares Tampered –
Homomorphic
(d) No Shares Tampered
Figure 5.9: Tampering detection
5.3.2 Privacy analysis
In this section, we give the privacy analysis of SR-MPVR and SR-MSSS.
The loss in privacy of a patient is dependent on two factors: loss of identity and loss of sensitive
information (e.g., the information about the diseases one is suffering from) associated with the
identity. Thus, the degree of privacy loss (Γ) can be modeled as:
Γ = Γi.Γd, (5.24)
where 0 ≤ Γi ≤ 1 denotes the degree of identity loss and 0 ≤ Γd ≤ 1 denotes the degree sensitive
information loss.
As proposed by Saini et. al. [97], Γi can be further modeled as a function of explicit information
Iwho (e.g., person’s name), and a set of implicit information such as Iwhere (e.g., place name), Iwhat
(e.g., activity), and Iwhen (e.g., time of an activity). When any of this information is color coded,
our scheme can hide it.
Irrespective of the value of Γi, the value of Γ can be lowered by lowering the value of Γd. Our
scheme, by hiding the color-coded information of an image, partly lowers Γi. Since the shape of an
image is available, the adversary can get useful information such as the type of disease that one is
suffering from.
However, our scheme can preserve privacy better than the schemes that hide only the identity
from the data/image (such as anonymization [98]), as hiding critical information from the third-
party datacenters lowers the risk of privacy loss even when information about the identity can be
known from external sources (such as from Iwho, Iwhere, and Iwhat).
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5.3.3 Performance analysis
The usability of the proposed cloud-based secured rendering technique is dependent on its com-
putational overhead, data overhead, and the visualization latency. There are three computational
overheads: first, the overhead at the server in creating n shares from the secret data voxels, sec-
ond, the computational overhead at the datacenters due to use of our scheme (e.g., rendering large
integers instead of rendering smaller ones), and finally, the overhead at the client in reconstructing
the secret image from k share images. Similarly, there are also two types of data overheads: first,
the requirement of an extra number of bits for the server to transmit n shares to n datacenters, and
second, the requirement of more bits to transmit k share images to the client. The computation of
shares and their distribution to datacenters are performed offline by the server. Therefore, we will
not consider them in further discussion. Furthermore, we also ignore the computational overhead
of a datacenter as we assume that a datacenter can render as fast as a server. However, the data
overhead in transmitting k share images and the computational overhead required to reconstruct the
secret image add to the latency in rendering. Therefore, we will discuss them below.
Data overhead
For SR-MPVR and SR-MSSS, our rendering framework requires k share images to reconstruct the
secret image. Thus, if b number of bits are required to represent a color component of a pixel of a
share image, then a total of 3bk+ 8 number of bits are required to reconstruct the color and opacity
of a pixel: due to which, the data overhead to the client is 3bk−2432 times more than conventional
server-side rendering. The value of b, however, is dependent on how we solve the incompatibility
issue of secret sharing with ray-casting. In the case of SR-MPVR, b is dependent on the rounding
off parameters d and f as the rendered color lies between 0 and q, where q > (255+max)×10d+f .
For SR-MSSS, b, however, is equivalent to the number of bits required to represent a real number.
Therefore, in our implementation, which uses (3, n) secret sharing, 32 bits for a real number, and
sets d = 4 and f = 6, SR-MPVR and SR-MSSS respectively result approximately 11 times and 8
times more data overhead to the client than the conventional server-side volume ray-casting.
In the case of SR-RSS, our rendering framework requires four color shares to recover the three
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Computation Cost High Low Moderate
Image Quality Lossy Lossless Lossy
color components of a pixel of the secret image. Thus, if b bits are required to represent a color
share, then a total of 4b + 8 bits are required by the client to obtain the secret color and opacity
value of a pixel in the secret image. However, we know that the value of a color share cannot exceed
65536× 10g, where g is the number of decimal places by which a share is rounded off. Therefore,
in our implementation of SR-RSS, which sets g = 1, a client must download approximately two
times more data than the conventional server-side volume ray-casting.
Computational overhead
In our framework, the computational overhead to the client is equal to the computation cost required
to recover the colors of the secret image from the share images. Therefore, client’s computational
overhead is dependent on the computation cost of Lagrange interpolation and the dimensions of the
image. As SR-MPVR uses the modular prime operation and large integer operations, its computa-
tion cost to the client is higher than the computation costs of SR-MSSS and of SR-RSS to the client.
The computation cost of SR-MSSS, however, varies with the computation cost of SR-RSS accord-
ing to the required number of shares to reconstruct the secret. In our implementation, SR-MPVR
and SR-MSSS take 132 ms and 29 ms, respectively, to recover a 512 × 512 rendered image from
the first, second, and third image shares. For the same image, SR-RSS takes 34 ms to recover the
secret image from the first, second, third, and fourth share images. Client’s computation overhead
for SR-RSS is more than that of SR-MSSS in our implementation, as the constructed polynomial
for SR-RSS is one degree higher than that of SR-MSSS.

















































































Figure 5.10: PSNR of the rendered image vs data overhead. As SR-MPVR results in a different
PSNR for a fixed overhead (as for a fixed number of rounding bits d+f , the PSNR can change with
the change in the value of d and f ), we show the maximum obtained PSNR.
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Image quality
By rounding off real numbers during rendering, both SR-MPVR and SR-RSS renders lossy image;
but SR-MSSS, without performing rounding operations, renders lossless images.
In the cases of SP-MPVR and SR-RSS, we can, however, obtain better quality images by using
higher precision fixed point numbers. As discussed in Section 5.3.3, a higher number of rounding
bits can increase the data overhead, resulting in a tradeoff between the quality of the image and
the data overhead. This claim can be verified from Figure 5.10, which, for our experimental setup,
shows the PSNR values of Head, Foot, Bucky, and Ironprot rendered images for different overheads.
As illustrated, to obtain a similar quality image, SR-MPVR leads to higher overhead than SR-RSS,
as SR-MPVR rounds off two floating point numbers in contrast to only one in SR-RSS. Note that
for any of these schemes, the PSNR values of different images are different for fixed overhead as
the round-off error and its effect on the final rendered color are dependent on the scalar values of
the data voxels.
Table 5.2 shows the security level, overheads, and image quality of all our proposed schemes:
SR-MPVR, SR-MSSS, and SR-RSS. As highlighted, (i) SR-MPVR is best suited for applications
prioritizing security over overheads and image quality; (ii) SR-RSS is suitable for applications re-
quiring low overhead at cost of high security and loss of information from the rendered image;
and (iii) SR-MSSS is designed for applications requiring lossless rendered images, and moderate
security and overhead.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we proposed our secure pre-classification volume ray-casting framework that hides
the color information from a 3D volumetric data from a datacenter, allows a datacenter to render a
color-hidden share image from a color-hidden share volume, and allows a user to recover the secret
image from the share images. We implemented the workflow of this framework both by integrating
the modified Shamir’s secret sharing (which do not use modular prime operation) with the con-
ventional pre-classification volume ray-casting, and by integrating integer-only pre-classification
volume ray-casting with the original Shamir’s secret sharing. For the later approach, we analysed
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the loss in information from a rendered image due the conversion of a floating point number to a
fixed point number. For both these schemes, our analysis, however, showed that the data overhead
to a user can be a concern. For applications requiring minimal overhead at the cost of high security,
we proposed a third technique that uses a modified ramp secret sharing (a ramp secret sharing that
does not use modular prime operation) and smaller share numbers to share the color information
of the volume data. We showed that in addition to hiding confidential color information from a
datacenter, all our three schemes can also ensure data integrity and data availability. None of these





In this chapter, we propose our secure post-classification volume ray-casting scheme that hides
both the color and opacity information of volume data/rendered images from cloud datacenters. In
this scheme, we assume that a datacenter performs Gouard shading to render the volume data.
The core idea of the proposed scheme is to distribute the ray-casting tasks among two groups of
datacenters, called Interpolator and Compositor, such that even though rendering operations other
than addition and scalar multiplication are not hidden, none of the groups can know the volume data
and rendered image. To hide the parts of the data/image that are added and scalar multiplied, we
use Shamir’s secret sharing as it is homomorphic to addition and scalar multiplication.
In this framework, a server first pre-computes pre ray-projection operations, such as gradi-
ent/normal estimation and calculation of Phong illumination factors, and of post-classification vol-
ume ray-casting, and then creates n shares of the scalar values and n shares of the outputs of the
pre ray-projection operations using Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing. The shared information is then
sent to Interpolator, which interpolates the shared scalars, shared gradients, and shared Phong illu-
mination factors. Next, the Interpolator sends interpolated values to Compositor by hiding the pixel
positions. Compositor completes the remaining rendering operations such as classification, shading,
and composition, and sends the noise-like rendered image to a user. Finally, the user recovers the
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secret image from noise-like rendered images.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 revisits post-classification ray-casting,
and points out useful observations that drove us to design the proposed framework. In Section 6.2,
we propose our secure cloud-based framework, and Section 6.3 shows its results and analyses.
6.1 Post-Classification Volume Ray-Casting
As discussed in Section 2.6.2 of Chapter 2, post-classification volume ray-casting renders 3D volu-
metric data in a pipeline of seven independent rendering components: gradient and normal estima-
tion, ray-projection, sampling, interpolation, classification, shading, and composition. Relevant to
our work, we made the following observations about these rendering components.
• The pre ray-projection rendering operations such as gradient/normal estimation, and the cal-
culation of Phong illumination factors Yv (the addition of ambient reflection coefficient and
diffuse reflection coefficient) and Zv (specular reflection coefficient) are performed only per
voxel once. Being independent of the user’s input, these operations can be pre-computed.
The rest of the rendering components, however, must be processed dynamically.
• Interpolation, which finds the scalar Ps, gradient Gs, and Phong illumination factors Ys and





for Ps (the same as for Gs, Ys, and Zs), where N(s) is the set of eight neighbouring voxels
of s, Pv is the scalar value, and 0 ≤ Dv ≤ 1 is the interpolating factor of the voxel v ∈ N(s).
Thus, when Dv is public, interpolation requires only additions and scalar multiplications.
• Shading, which finds the color of a sample point s, is defined as
Cs = C
↑
sYs + Zs, (6.2)
where C
↑
s is the classified color found from the color look-up table by using Ps as an index.
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Thus, when Cs is public, shading requires additions and scalar multiplications.
• Composition finds the color C and opacity A along a projected ray from the shaded colors



















andAs is the classified opacity of s. Thus, for publicOi, color composition requires additions
and scalar multiplications, and opacity composition requires addition.
• After interpolation, the position and direction of a projected ray, which can disclose the co-
ordinate of the pixel that casted it, are not required; rather, a ray must be distinguished from
other rays as sample points along this ray need to be identified during color/opacity composi-
tion.
6.2 Our Framework
Based on the discussion in Section 6.1, we now design our secure rendering framework.
6.2.1 Architecture
As shown in Figure 6.1, our framework consists of four main components: the server that holds
secret data, the Interpolator that contains n ≥ 2 datacenters and performs ray-dependent rendering
operations (such as sampling and interpolation), the Compositor that contains n datacenters and
performs post-interpolation operations (such as classification, shading, and composition), and the
client who is authorized to access the secret image.
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of secure cloud-based post-classification volume ray-casting
This framework assumes that (i) the server and client are the trusted entities, (ii) the datacenters
are connected among themselves and with the client via a high speed network, (iii) the intra-group
and inter-group communication of the datacenters is regulated, (iv) an adversary cannot access
k ≤ n or more datacenters in Interpolator or in Compositor, and (v) an adversary cannot access a
datacenter in Interpolator and Compositor simultaneously.
6.2.2 Workflow
As shown in Figure 6.2, the workflow of the framework can be divided into four main steps: data
preparation, ray-projection, post ray-projection rendering, and image recovery. In the following, we
discuss each step in detail.
Data preparation
This step creates n shares of the secret volume V . To achieve this, the server first calculates the
gradient Gv and Phong illumination factors Yv and Zv of each data voxel v ∈ V , and then hides the
calculated values and the scalar Pv by using Shamir’s (k, n) secret sharing.
However, we know that Pv, Gv, Yv, and Zv are floating point numbers. Therefore, they are
incompatible with Shamir’s secret sharing. Based on the discussion in Section 3.2, we address this
issue by converting Pv,Gv, Yv, and Zv to fixed point numbers before secret sharing. In other words,



























Figure 6.2: Workflow of secure cloud-based post-classification volume ray-casting
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we represent Pv (the same as for Gv, Yv, and Zv) by
P (d)v = (Pv + Pv ,d)× 10d, (6.6)
where Pv ,d is the round-off error obtained by rounding off Pv by d decimal places.














v , and Z
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v .
Next, by setting x = p in F (x), we find the pth share of P (d)v by
P (d)v,p =
(









Using the same technique, we also find the pth share ofG(d)v , the pth share of Y
(d)
v , and the pth share




v,p , and Z
(d)
v,p , respectively.
Then, we construct the pth share volume Vp using P
(d)
v,p as the scalar value, G
(d)
v,p as the gradi-
ent, and Y (d)v,p and Z
(d)
v,p as the Phong illumination factors of the data voxel vp ∈ Vp that has the
same (x, y, z)-coordinate as the voxel v ∈ V . This share volume is sent to the pth datacenter in
Interpolator.
Ray-projection
In this step, rays from each pixel in the image space are projected on each share volume stored
in a datacenter in Interpolator. As we assume that the set of rays projected on a share volume
is equivalent to the set of rays that could have been projected on the secret volume, sets of rays
projected to different share volumes are equivalent. We, however, do not project rays to datacenters
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in Compositor.
Post ray-projection ray-casting
This operation is cooperatively performed by Interpolator and Compositor to render the volume
data. Interpolator first performs the ray-dependent interpolation operations such as sampling and
interpolation, and then outsources the post-interpolation operations such as classification, shading,
and composition to Compositor by hiding the information about the pixel coordinates of the image
space. As the post ray-projection of one share volume is similar to others, and in a share volume, the
rendering along all the projected rays is similar, we will focus our further discussion on rendering
along one ray on the pth share volume Vp.
Ray-dependent rendering
Sampling: In this step, a ray projected on Vp is sampled at c sample points s1,p, s2,p, . . . , sc,p
such that xyz-coordinate si,p and xyz-coordinate si (a sample point on the ray when it is projected
on V ) are the same.
Interpolation: To obtain the scalar value, gradient, and Phong illumination factors of a sample
point s, this step interpolates the scalar values, gradients, and Phong illumination factors of eight
neighbouring voxels of s ∈ Vp.
The interpolation of scalars (the same as for gradients and Phong illumination factors) involves
multiplying a scalar share P (d)v,p by floating point number Dv. Thus, we replace Dv with a fixed
point number
D(f)v = (Dv + Dv ,f )× 10f , (6.10)
where Dv ,f is the round-off error obtained by rounding off Dv by f decimal places. As a result,
the scaled interpolated scalar P ′s,p (the same as for scaled interpolated gradient G′s,p and scaled
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mod q
≡ ((Ps + Ps)× 10d+f + αs,p) mod q, (by Equation 6.1) (6.11)




(Pv ,dDv + Dv ,fPv + Pv ,dDv ,f )




(Dv + Dv ,f )αv,p × 10f . (6.12)
Note that as the interpolated scalars and gradients are in shared form, by using these values in
look up tables, a datacenter cannot get the secret colors and opacities.
To complete the remaining rendering operations, the pth datacenter in Interpolator copies its
interpolated scalar P ′s,p and interpolated gradient G′s,p to each datacenter in Compositor, but sends
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the interpolated Phong illumination factors Y ′s,p and Z ′s,p only to the pth datacenter of Compositor.
To hide the pixel positions of the image space from Compositor while distinguishing the sam-
ple points along a ray from other sample points, the pth datacenter creates a proxy identification
PID(S,T ) of a ray that originated from a pixel having the coordinates (S, T ), and in place of (S, T ),
sends this proxy to the pth datacenter of Compositor. The secret (S, T ), however, is required during
the image recovery stage. Thus, the pth datacenter of Interpolator also sends the pth share of (S, T )
to the pth datacenter of Compositor. If (Sp, Tp) denotes the pth share of (S, T ), then by Shamir’s
secret sharing Sp (the same as for Tp) can be found by




i) mod q′, (6.13)
where ai is a random number and q′ > S is a prime number.
Post-interpolation rendering
In this step, each datacenter in Compositor performs post-interpolation rendering operations, such
as classification, shading, and composition, on the interpolated data received from the datacenters
of Interpolator. As these operations are the same in all the datacenters, we focus our discussion on
the pth datacenter.
Classification: The objective of this step is to find the classified color and classified opacity of a
sample point using scalar shares and gradient shares. The pth datacenter of Compositor receives n
shares of scalars and gradients from the datacenters of Interpolator. Thus, using Lagrange interpo-
lation, we can recover the secret interpolated scalars and gradients. Mathematically, the Lagrange
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ti(x) mod q, (6.16)
where ti(x) is the Lagrange basis function,





(Dv + Dv ,f )ai,v.
As the value of Dv and f are public, βs,p is a constant for all the shares.
By the Unisolvence theorem, L(x), however, represents
L(x) =
(







Thus, by first putting x = 0 in L(x), and then dividing L(0) by 10d+f , we recover the secret
interpolated scalar as P ′′s . This recovered scalar is then used as an index to the look-up tables to find
the classified colors and opacities.
Note that the recovered scalar involves round-off error Ps . Thus, when P
′′
s is used as an index to




in the classified color value C
↑
s and As in the classified
opacity As. In other words, using P ′′s and recovered interpolated gradient G′′s , we can find the
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classified color and opacity as















A′s = As + As . (6.18)
As the look-up tables are implemented as piecewise linear functions, even for a very small value
of Ps (for example, Ps approaches zero), the value of C↑s can be as large as 255 (same argument
for As). In practice, the possibility of such high error, however, is less as Ps is often unable to
change the value of truncated P ′′s (truncation is performed before the look-up operation), and in a
look-up table, there are few spiked transitions for neighbouring entries (due to spatial coherence in
an image). However, to obtain zero round-off error, we can set the value of rounding bits d and f as
large as the machine precision.
Shading: Using the classified colors and the Phong illumination factors received from Interpo-
lator, each datacenter of Compositor performs color shading. The pth datacenter of Compositor,
however, receives only the pth share of the Phong illumination factors: Y ′s,p and Z ′s,p. Therefore,
even though the classified colors and classified opacities are known, the pth datacenter can only
know the pth share of the shaded color.
Using Equation 6.2, the pth share of the scaled shaded color can be found by
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≡ ((Cs + Cs)× 10d+f + (C↑s + C↑s + 1)αs,p) mod q, (by Equation 6.2) (6.19)
where Cs is the color shaded by conventional rendering, and
Cs = C
↑
s Ys + C↑s
Ys + C↑s
Ys + Zs (6.20)
is the error in shading.
Composition: In this step, each datacenter accumulates the shaded colors and classified opaci-
ties of c sample points which hold PID(S,T ), and find the opacity and color share along the ray
originated from (S, T ).
The classified opacity A′s of a sample point s is close to the opacity of s obtained in conventional
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(6.22)
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is the error in opacity composition.
On the other hand, the shaded color C ′s,p of s is a share of the shaded color of s obtained in
conventional rendering. Thus, the composition of these shaded color shares will also produce a
share of the color composited in conventional rendering.
We, however, know that conventional color composition (given in Equation 6.3) cannot compos-
ite color shares as it involves floating point operations. In our case, the floating point operand is O′i.





i + O′i,g)× 10g, (6.25)
where O′i,g is the round-off error obtained in rounding off O
′
i by g decimal places. Using O
(g),′
i in
place of Oi, and shaded color share C ′s,p in place Cs in Equation 6.3, we obtain the pth share of the
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)× 10d+f+g + Γp) mod q
≡ ((C + C)× 10d+f+g + Γp) mod q, (by Equation 6.3) (6.26)
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i (Dv + Dv ,f )aj,v × 10f .
Note that bj is a constant for all the shares as aj,v, Dv, f , g, C
↑
si , Oi, and c are public.




and As can be as large as 255 (as discussed
earlier), the error in color composition C and the error in opacity composition A can be as large as
255. However, we have argued before that, in practice, such a case is unlikely.





= 0 and As = 0. By putting As = 0 in Equation 6.22, we obtain Oi = 0. Putting this value
of Oi in Equation 6.24 and Equation 6.20, we obtain A = 0 and s = 0, respectively. Finally,





We know that the round-off error O′i,g satisfies |O′i,g| ≤ 0.5× 10−f . Thus, for g > 3 + t, where t
is an integer satisfying c ≤ 10t, we can bound C by ±1.
Finally, collecting the composited color C ′p, composited opacity A′, and the coordinates (Sp, Tp)
of all PID(S,T ), the pth datacenter constructs the pth share image, and transmits this share image
to the user.
Image recovery
In this step, an authorized user recovers the secret image from k share images received from any
k datacenters. The opacity of a pixel in the share image is not hidden, therefore the opacity A′
of the pth pixel of a share image becomes the opacity of the pth pixel of the secret image. The
(x, y)-coordinates and colors of a pixel of the secret image, however, are obtained by Lagrange
interpolation on k shares of (x, y)-coordinates (i.e., k (Sp, Tp)’s) and k color shares (i.e., k C ′p’s)
respectively.
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Thus, we find the secret S by setting x = 0 in L(x).
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By the Unisolvence theorem,
M(x) =
(







Thus, by first setting x = 0 in M(x) and then dividing M(0) by 10d+f+g, we recover the secret
color as C + C .
Note that as M(0) ≤ (C+ maxC )×10d+f+g, where maxC is the maximum value of C , the prime
number q must be greater than (C+maxC )×10d+f+g. For example, for d and f as large as machine
precision, and g ≥ 3 + t, q must be greater than 256× 10d+f+g.
6.3 Results and Analysis
We simulated the server, the datacenters, and the client in a PC powered by an Intel Core 2 Quad
2.83 Ghz processor and with 4GB of RAM. We implemented our secure post-classification volume
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(a) Secret Bucky (b) Secret Head (c) Secret Foot (d) Secret Ironprot
(e) First Share of Bucky (f) Second Share of Head (g) Third Share of Foot (h) First Share of Ironprot
(i) Third Share of Bucky (j) Third Share of Head (k) Fourth Share of Foot (l) Third Share of Ironprot
(m) Fourth Share of Bucky (n) Fourth Share of Head (o) Fifth Share of Foot (p) Fourth Share of Ironprot
(q) Reconstructed Bucky (r) Reconstructed Head (s) Reconstructed Foot (t) Reconstructed Ironprot
Figure 6.3: Rendered image in Interpolator
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(a) Secret Bucky (b) Secret Head (c) Secret Foot (d) Secret Ironprot
(e) First Share of Bucky (f) Second Share of Head (g) Third Share of Foot (h) First Share of Ironprot
(i) Third Share of Bucky (j) Third Share of Head (k) Fourth Share of Foot (l) Third Share of Ironprot
(m) Fourth Share of Bucky (n) Fourth Share of Head (o) Fifth Share of Foot (p) Fourth Share of Ironprot
(q) Reconstructed Bucky (r) Reconstructed Head (s) Reconstructed Foot (t) Reconstructed Ironprot
Figure 6.4: Rendered image in Compositor
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(a) Secret (b) Third Share (c) Secret (d) Third Share
(e) Secret (f) Third Share (g) Secret (h) Third Share
(i) Secret (j) Third Share (k) Secret (l) Third Share
(m) Secret (n) Third Share (o) Secret (p) Third Share
(q) Secret (r) Third Share (s) Secret (t) Third Share
(u) Secret (v) Third Share (w) Secret (x) Third Share
Figure 6.5: Rendered image in Compositor from multiple view points
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ray-casting by integrating (3, 5) Shamir’s secret sharing to the volume ray-casting module of open
source 3D visualization software VTK. As our implementation of VTK allows a maximum of 64
bits to represent an integer, to convert a real number to an integer while keeping the error less, we
fixed d = 5, f = 5 , and g = 6. To validate our scheme, we used four sets of test volume data: Foot,
Head, Bucky, and Ironprot, whose details are given in Table 5.1.
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the secret image, share images, and the recovered image in the
Interpolator and Compositor respectively. Figure 6.5 shows the results from multiple view points.
As can be verified from these figures, the image available to an individual datacenter of Interpolator
or Compositor is noise-like.
Note that since the color table look-up operations are performed by the Compositor, the pro-
posed scheme does not need interaction with the server to provide user interactions requiring the
modification of color look-up table.
6.3.1 Security analyses
We now analyze the level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy that our scheme
provides.
Confidentiality
In addition to the perceptual security, which can be verified from Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, and Fig-
ure 6.5, our scheme, by using Shamir’s secret sharing to hide the shading factors both in Interpolator
and in Compositor, offers perfect secrecy for shaded colors. Furthermore, as we use Shamir’s secret
sharing to hide unshaded color in Interpolator and pixel positions in Compositor, a datacenter in
Interpolator or in Compositor, irrespective of knowledge of pixel positions and of unshaded colors,
respectively, can get little information (which is constant in a group of at most k − 1 datacenters)
about the image. This information only helps an adversary in guessing the secret image. With-
out all required information, the reconstructed image, as shown Figure 6.3 for Interpolator, is also
noise-like.
However, as a datacenter in Interpolator can know the secret (x, y)-coordinate of a pixel and a
datacenter in Compositor can know the secret opacity and unshaded color, an adversary, by access-
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.6: (a), (b), and (c) are the recovered images when all three share images are tampered, two
share images are tampered, and one share image is tampered respectively.
ing only one datacenter in Interpolator and one datacenter in Compositor, can know the rendered
image.
Integrity
By inheriting the property of (k, n) secret sharing, our scheme ensures data/image integrity when
an adversary can access at most n− 1 datacenters in Interpolator or Compositor.





different ways to reconstruct the secret image. Therefore,
if an adversary tampers with the share volume of at most n − 1 datacenters in Interpolator or the
share images of at most n − 1 datacenters in Compositor, then at most (n−1k ) images, which are
recovered from k share images that were tampered by obeying the homomorphic property of secret
sharing, can be alike (if tampering does not obey the homomorphic property, then the recovered
images can be different). The remaining recovered images, which use the correct share image in
image recovery, however, will be different from the images recovered from tampered images (as





+ 1 recovered images, the client can
detect tampering. However, if the adversary can tamper the information of all n datacenters in
Interpolator/Compositor, then our scheme fails to detect tampering. Similarly, in the case of (k, k)
secret sharing, which produces only one recovered image, our scheme cannot detect tampering even
when only one share image is tampered.
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Availability
Due to (k, n) secret sharing, our scheme also ensures data availability as the client is able to recon-
struct the secret image even if at most n−k datacenters in Compositor are unable to participate. The
non-participation of a datacenter in Compositor can either be due to the unavailability of necessary
information from the respective datacenter in Interpolator (when a datacenter in Interpolator does
not participate) or due to local issues.
6.3.2 Privacy analysis
The privacy loss is dependent on two factors: loss of identity and loss of sensitive information (e.g.,
the information about the diseases one is suffering from) associated with the identity. The loss of
one factor in the absence of another, however, is harmless. Thus, by not disclosing the sensitive
information contained in the data/image to an unauthorized user, our scheme preserves the privacy
of the owner of the data/image.
6.3.3 Performance analysis
The usability of our framework is dependent on its computational overhead and data overhead,
which are analyzed in this section. These costs affect the visualization latency of interacting with
the rendered image. We are, however, less concerned with the overhead associated with the pre
ray-projection operation since it can be performed offline.
Data overhead
Our framework introduces two types of data overhead: one during the communication of informa-
tion from Interpolator to Compositor and another during the communication of k share images from
Compositor to the client.
In our framework, the mth datacenter in Compositor requires at least k shares of the scalar value,
k shares of the gradient, and one share of the shading factors per sample point. Therefore, if b1
bits are required to represent a share (which is equal to the number of bits required to represent the
prime number q), a total of 2kb1 + 2b1 number of bits are required by a datacenter in Compositor
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to complete rendering. Additionally, the datacenter also must download b2 bits to receive a share of
the (x, y) coordinate of a pixel. Thus, in our implementation that uses (3, 5) secret sharing, b1 = 64,
and b2 = 18, a datacenter in Compositor must download approximately five times more data than
conventional cloud-based rendering.
Similarly, the user requires k share images to recover the secret image. Thus, a total of (3b1 +
b2)k+ 8 bits is required to reconstruct the color and opacity of a pixel: due to which, the data over-
head is (3b1+b2)k−2432 times more than conventional server-side volume ray-casting. Therefore, for
our implementation, the user must download approximately 19 times more data than conventional
server-side volume ray-casting – such high data overhead is the main weakness of our scheme.
Computation overhead
Our scheme has two types of computation overhead: the computational overhead during rendering
and the computational overhead during image recovery.
We assume that a datacenter in our scheme can render its share image as fast as a server in
the conventional ray-casting can render the secret image. Therefore, the computational overhead
in rendering mainly results from a datacenter in Interpolator performing k(k − 1) extra integer
multiplications, 2(k− 1) extra integer additions, and two integer modular prime operations to share
the (x, y)-coordinate of a pixel, and creating the PID(x,y) for each pixel. Thus, in our simulation,
which is implemented in C, a datacenter must work for an extra 94 ms for a 512×512 image space.
The computational overhead in recovering the secret image is dependent on the computation cost
of the Lagrange interpolation, which is used to reconstruct the secret color value and the secret
(x, y)-coordinate of a pixel, and the dimensions of the image space. Our C implementation to
recover a secret image from the first, second, and third share images finds the computation cost to
be approximately 172 ms for a 512× 512 dimension image.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, first, we modified post-classification volume ray-casting to perform integer-only op-
erations by converting all floating point numbers to fixed point numbers. Then, we proposed our
CHAPTER 6. SECURE POST-CLASSIFICATION VOLUME RAY-CASTING 117
secure post-classification volume ray-casting framework that hides both the color and opacity in-
formation from a 3D volumetric data from a datacenter by using Shamir’s secret sharing, allows a
datacenter to render a noise-like share image from a share volume, and allows a user to recover the
secret image from the share images. Although this framework provides full perceptual confiden-
tiality by hiding both color and shape of an object from a datacenter, high data overhead to a user,
however, is a concern.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Cloud-based imaging presents security and privacy concerns. Although these concerns have been
addressed for cloud-based volume data/image storage, they are still an issue for cloud-based volume
data/image processing, such as image scaling/cropping or volume ray-casting. Securing cloud-based
volume data/image processing is challenging since: (i) no cryptosystem can hide all operations of
a volume data/image processing algorithm with acceptable overhead, and (ii) the floating point
operations of a volume data/image processing algorithm are incompatible with the modular prime
operations of a cryptosystem.
This thesis addressed the security and privacy issues in three popular cloud-based image pro-
cessing schemes: cloud-based image scaling/cropping, cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-
casting, and cloud-based post-classification volume ray-casting, by using Shamir’s secret sharing
(and its variants) to hide the additions and scalar multiplications operations of these algorithms.
Other operations were either pre-computed or distributed among datacenters such that none of the
datacenters gets enough information to know the secret volume data/image. To solve the incompat-
ibility issue of Shamir’s secret sharing with a volume data/image processing algorithm, we either
excluded the modular prime operation from secret sharing or converted floating point operations to
fixed point operations. We showed that the former technique degrades security, and the latter loses
some information from the rendered image.
Our secure image scaling/cropping framework (Chapter 4) uses a new (3, k, n) ramp secret image
sharing scheme to share an image. This image sharing scheme allows scaling/croping of noise-
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like shadow images stored in third-party datacenters. Receiving at least k scaled/cropped shadow
images, a user can recover the secret scaled/cropped image. Experiments and analyses showed
that this framework can hide the content of an image in a datacenter, detect tampering of an image
performed at a datacenter, and withstand the breakdown of certain number of datacenters. This
framework results in low computation overhead, but significant data overhead (1.5 times more data
overhead than conventional image streaming) to the user.
Our secure cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-casting framework (Chapter 5) hides the
color information of volume data from datacenters. This color-hidden data renders to color-hidden
images, which can be used by a user to recover the secret rendered image. Since Shamir’s secret
sharing is non-homomorphic to opacity multiplications, this scheme, however, cannot hide the shape
of an object. To address the incompatibility of secret sharing with ray-casting, we modified either
secret sharing (which is the case in SR-MSSS) or ray-casting (which is the case in SR-MSSS), and
to decrease the high data overhead of both these techniques, we optimized modified secret sharing
(which is the case in SR-RSS). Experiments and analyses showed that among our three frameworks,
SR-MPVR provides high security at the cost of high data overhead and the loss of some information
from the rendered image; SR-MSSS renders a lossless image and provides moderate security at the
cost of moderate data overhead; and SR-RSS incurs low data overhead at the cost of high security
and some information loss from the rendered image.
Finally, we proposed secure post-classification volume ray-casting (Chapter 6), which hides both
the color and shape of an object from rendering datacenters. This scheme distributes the render-
ing tasks among a number of datacenters and integrates Shamirs secret sharing into the rendering
pipeline in such a way that none of the datacenters can know the secret data or the rendered image.
A user, however, can recover the secret image from the hidden images. Experiments and analyses
showed that this framework can also detect tampering of data/image performed at a datacenter, and
can withstand breakdown of certain number of datacenters. This framework results in low compu-
tation cost and high data overhead (19 times more data overhead than conventional rendering) to the
user.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply Shamir’s secret sharing based secure
multiparty computation to 2D image scaling/cropping and volume ray-casting algorithms. In this
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work, we mainly studied the feasibility of applying secret sharing (or its variant) to an imaging
algorithm, and designed practical secure frameworks. At this point, we were less concerned about
performance and image quality.
Future works, however, may focus on improving the performance and image quality of the pro-
posed frameworks. Furthermore, the presented ideas can be applied to secure other areas such as
secure video scaling/cropping, secure surface rendering etc. In the following, we briefly discuss
some of the possible future works.
7.1 Improvement of the Proposed Frameworks
In this section, we discuss one improvement each for secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping,
secure cloud-based pre-classification volume ray-casting, and secure cloud-based post-classification
volume ray-casting.
7.1.1 Secure scaling/cropping of a compressed images
Our secure cloud-based image scaling/cropping framework scales and crops an uncompressed shadow
image. Thus, a datacenter must either store an uncompressed image, or decompress a compressed
shadow image before scaling/cropping. Evidently, The former approach results in high data over-
head. The latter approach, which is typically used in conventional image scaling/cropping, is not
much more improved than the former since the spatial coherence of an image is destroyed in a
noise-like shadow image. As a result, the proposed framework requires significantly more storage
and bandwidth than conventional image streaming.
One can decrease the storage and bandwidth requirements by secret sharing a compressed image,
and allowing scaling/cropping of a shadow image of the compressed image. Since compression
techniques differ from one another, a framework involving one compression technique can present
different challenges than a framework involving another compression technique. For JPEG com-
pression, we briefly discuss the challenges below.
Secret sharing a JPEG compressed image [99], and scaling/cropping a secret JPEG compressed
image [100, 101] have been independently studied. Proposed secret sharing schemes and proposed
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scaling/cropping schemes simultaneously hide and scale the DCT coefficients. Thus, an obvious
approach can be to combine these schemes, and hide the DCT coefficients such that scaling can be
performed on the hidden coefficients. As described below, such an approach, however, is not trivial.
To hide DCT coefficients, existing secret sharing schemes secret share DC coefficients, and either
permute or randomize the AC coefficients [99]. Permutation of AC coefficients does not support
cropping, and using the DC coefficient as a seed to randomize AC coefficients does not support
scaling. Furthermore, hiding all the AC coefficients makes zig-zag coding inefficient, and therefore
increases the size of the compressed image. Thus, a new secret sharing scheme must be designed.
An obvious approach can be to secret share all the AC coefficients, but use one secret sharing
polynomial for all the coefficients having the same value. We believe that this scheme can produce
noise-like images, and does not disturb zig-zag coding. The discloser of the number of AC coef-
ficients and their positions, however, can weaken security since the value of some high frequency
coefficients can be guessed. Thus, a detailed analysis of this approach and the possible tradeoffs
need to be examined.
7.1.2 Hiding the shape of an object in secure pre-classification ray-casting
Our secure pre-classification volume ray-casting cannot hide the shape of an object from a data-
center, and therefore does not provide high data confidentiality. We know that the shape can be
hidden only when the opacities are hidden, and Shamir’s secret sharing is non-homomorphic to the
multiplications in opacity rendering. Thus, new techniques must be devised to hide both colors and
opacities. In the following, we discuss two preliminary ideas.
First, we can use the idea of a secure post-classification volume ray-casting framework to separate
color rendering from opacity rendering such that the color renderer (i.e., the group of datacenters
rendering the color) does not know the secret opacities, and the opacity renderer does not know
the secret pixel positions. Instead, shares of opacities can be provided to the color renderer, and
proxy pixel positions can be provided to the opacity renderer. Executing such an idea, however, is
challenging since the direction of the projected rays cannot be hidden during opacity interpolation.
Alternatively, the opacities can be hidden by using a cryptosystem that is homomorphic to un-
limited multiplications. Cryptosystems such as ElGamal encryption, which are homomorphic to a
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predefined number of multiplications, can fulfill this requirement with high overheads. In future,
it will be interesting to examine if such a cryptosystem can be used in combination with Shamir’s
secret sharing.
7.1.3 Using Phong shading in post-classification ray-casting
Our secure post classification volume ray-casting uses Gouard shading, and therefore renders infe-
rior color than volume ray-casting using Phong shading. Thus, in the future, one can improve our
scheme by supporting Phong shading.
Phong shading computes the illumination factors










Thus, to hide the shaded color, both Ys and Zs must be hidden. We can hide Ys and Zs by hiding at
least one variable in the computation of Ys and Zs. The ambient coefficient ka, diffuse coefficient
kd, specular coefficient ks, and specular shininess n can be assumed to be public since they can be
known by knowing the type of object being rendered. As a result, we have to hide either normal
Ns, or light L and reflected light R to secure Phong shading. Both these options can be explored in
future works.
7.2 Secure Video Scaling/Cropping
Cloud-based video storage/processing, such as cloud-based video conferencing and cloud-based
video surveillance, are becoming popular. In this technique, videos, which can contain confidential
information, are stored and processed at third-party cloud datacenters.
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Although cloud-based video storage/processing can be advantageous than conventional server-
side video storage/processing, security and privacy are the main concerns. For example, by access-
ing a datacenter, an adversary can know the participants and discussed confidential information of a
video conference, or can know the identity of a person on surveillance. One can, however, address
the security and privacy concerns by hiding the content of a video from a datacenter.
Two important operations on video are scaling and cropping. Downloading a large video, such
as a surveillance video, may not anyways be feasible. Users connected through different devices
may request video at different scale levels. Furthermore, users may just want to view a particular
region of interest in the video, in which case, a cropped region should be downloaded. These two
operations, scaling and cropping, can be combined to support zooming and panning, two natural
user interactions. Thus, video scaling and cropping must be supported by a datacenter.
Video scaling/cropping [102], and video hiding [103, 104] are two independently well-studied ar-
eas. To the best of our knowledge, scaling/cropping a hidden video, however, has not been done yet.
In the future, one may work on addressing this problem by extending our idea of scaling/cropping a
hidden image.
7.3 Secure Surface Rendering
The cloud-based surface rendering framework, also called cloud-based indirect volume rendering,
uses surface rendering to remotely render a 3D image. In this framework, an organization captures
a set of 2D images and sends the captured images to a datacenter. Upon a user’s request, the
datacenter renders a 3D image from the image set by using a surface rendering algorithm, and sends
the rendered image to the user. Although use of cloud datacenters relieves an organization from the
complex rendering tasks, disclosure of confidential 2D images to datacenters creates security and
privacy concerns.
Securing surface rendering is more challenging than direct volume rendering since surface ren-
dering performs more complex operations. To render a 3D image, surface rendering first extracts
isosurfaces from an image set, and then renders the isosurfaces by an isosurface rendering algorithm.
The isosurfaces are typically extracted by marching cube or the marching tetrahedra algorithm, and
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the extracted isosurfaces are rendered by the volume ray-casting or rasterization algorithm. Thus,
to secure surface rendering, both the isosurface extraction algorithm and isosurface rendering al-
gorithm must be secured. Furthermore, since hidden isosurfaces need to be input to the isosurface
rendering algorithm, our secure volume ray-casting techniques cannot be used.
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